The Correlated History of Social Organization, Morality, and Religion
... of these traits presumably evolved by small steps from ape precursors in a sequence that is much less well understood. In this chapter I relate this functional analysis of morality and religion to the evolutionary history of human sociality. I consider morality to be the individual cognitive faculty ...
... of these traits presumably evolved by small steps from ape precursors in a sequence that is much less well understood. In this chapter I relate this functional analysis of morality and religion to the evolutionary history of human sociality. I consider morality to be the individual cognitive faculty ...
Is There an Evolutionary Foundation for Human
... justice is drawn towards the good in itself and thus to God, without reference to any advantage to the self. Loving an enemy is the paradigm case because it so clearly leaves behind the self and its extensions to others in one’s community and tribe. On the other hand, the affection for advantage is ...
... justice is drawn towards the good in itself and thus to God, without reference to any advantage to the self. Loving an enemy is the paradigm case because it so clearly leaves behind the self and its extensions to others in one’s community and tribe. On the other hand, the affection for advantage is ...
USC3002_References - Department of Mathematics
... Dawkins, Clinton Richard, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins is a British ethologist, evolutionary biologist, and popular science writer who holds the Charles Simonyi Chair for the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University. Dawkins first came to prominence with his 1976 book The ...
... Dawkins, Clinton Richard, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Dawkins is a British ethologist, evolutionary biologist, and popular science writer who holds the Charles Simonyi Chair for the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford University. Dawkins first came to prominence with his 1976 book The ...
Tribal social instincts and the cultural evolution of institutions to
... As an empirical phenomenon, anthropologists, sociologists, and others from across the social sciences have long noted the existence of both social norms and institutions, often evoking each to explain behavioral similarities within groups, or to differentiate groups and societies. However, despite t ...
... As an empirical phenomenon, anthropologists, sociologists, and others from across the social sciences have long noted the existence of both social norms and institutions, often evoking each to explain behavioral similarities within groups, or to differentiate groups and societies. However, despite t ...
Evolution of Aging and Late Life
... How can we test theories of aging? If Aging has evolutionary basis 1.) Early reproduction will accelerate aging in population. 2.) Late reproduction will slow aging in population. ...
... How can we test theories of aging? If Aging has evolutionary basis 1.) Early reproduction will accelerate aging in population. 2.) Late reproduction will slow aging in population. ...
Note
... Proof of Nash Theorem. Fix a finite strategic game (S1 , . . . , Sn , p1 , . . . , pn ). Define the function besti : ×j6=i ∆Sj → P(∆Si ) by besti (m−i ) := {mi ∈ ∆Si | mi is a best response to m−i }. Then define the function best : ∆S1 × . . . × ∆Sn → P(∆S1 × . . . × ∆Sn ) by best(m) := best1 (m−1 ) ...
... Proof of Nash Theorem. Fix a finite strategic game (S1 , . . . , Sn , p1 , . . . , pn ). Define the function besti : ×j6=i ∆Sj → P(∆Si ) by besti (m−i ) := {mi ∈ ∆Si | mi is a best response to m−i }. Then define the function best : ∆S1 × . . . × ∆Sn → P(∆S1 × . . . × ∆Sn ) by best(m) := best1 (m−1 ) ...
Darwinian Conflict Theory and Evolutionary Sociology
... human societies, including the transition over time from one social form to another. Schmid is perhaps confused for good reason on this point, because in my work I use the term evolutionary in two rather distinct ways. Evolutionary can be used to refer to the evolution of societies or social forms, ...
... human societies, including the transition over time from one social form to another. Schmid is perhaps confused for good reason on this point, because in my work I use the term evolutionary in two rather distinct ways. Evolutionary can be used to refer to the evolution of societies or social forms, ...
Behavioral conformity in games with many players
... that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash equilibrium or an approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of players into societies where all individuals within the same society are similar and play the same or similar strategies and where most or all societies are nontrivial in ...
... that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash equilibrium or an approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of players into societies where all individuals within the same society are similar and play the same or similar strategies and where most or all societies are nontrivial in ...
