LEADER-FOLLOWER GAMES - Kyoto University Research
... The multi-leader-follower game has been studied by some researchers and used to model several problems in applications. particular type of multi-leader multifollower games was first studied by Sherali [34], where he established an existence result about the equilibrium by assuming that each leader c ...
... The multi-leader-follower game has been studied by some researchers and used to model several problems in applications. particular type of multi-leader multifollower games was first studied by Sherali [34], where he established an existence result about the equilibrium by assuming that each leader c ...
On the computational complexity of evolution
... The theory of evolution, as that was formulated by Darwin, has had a profound impact in the sciences, not only in biology but also in the social sciences and economics. From a mathematical perspective, evolutionary theory relies on the framework of noncooperative games. From such an analytical persp ...
... The theory of evolution, as that was formulated by Darwin, has had a profound impact in the sciences, not only in biology but also in the social sciences and economics. From a mathematical perspective, evolutionary theory relies on the framework of noncooperative games. From such an analytical persp ...
Verifiable Equilibria in Boolean Games
... model, with a natural computational interpretation [Harrenstein et al., 2001; Bonzon et al., 2006; Dunne et al., 2008; Endriss et al., 2011]. In a Boolean game, each player i has under its unique control a set of Boolean variables i , from an overall set of Boolean variables . Player i can assign va ...
... model, with a natural computational interpretation [Harrenstein et al., 2001; Bonzon et al., 2006; Dunne et al., 2008; Endriss et al., 2011]. In a Boolean game, each player i has under its unique control a set of Boolean variables i , from an overall set of Boolean variables . Player i can assign va ...
30. TYPE OF THE RETAILER PROBLEM WITH COMPLETE INFORMATION WITH NASH EQUALIBRIA REPEATEDLY
... demand of one can be reallocated to another, then the small firms may want to see the order/production of the leader before they place their orders. In the Stackelberg version of the competitive retailer problem, there is a market leader retailer and other is the follower. The leader makes his decis ...
... demand of one can be reallocated to another, then the small firms may want to see the order/production of the leader before they place their orders. In the Stackelberg version of the competitive retailer problem, there is a market leader retailer and other is the follower. The leader makes his decis ...
Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games 1 Motivating Example 2
... (a) all players use the top edge, social cost: 16 (b) three players use the top edge, one player uses the bottom edge, social cost: 13 (c) two players use the top edge, two players use the bottom edge, social cost: 12 (d) one player uses the top edge, three players use the bottom edge, social cost: ...
... (a) all players use the top edge, social cost: 16 (b) three players use the top edge, one player uses the bottom edge, social cost: 13 (c) two players use the top edge, two players use the bottom edge, social cost: 12 (d) one player uses the top edge, three players use the bottom edge, social cost: ...
Two-Person Games with Unique Nash Equilibria
... class of games with unique Nash equilibria. We did not expect much as these conditions are rather simple, but to our surprise, our program returned a condition that is more general than the strict competitiveness condition. As it turned out, it exactly corresponds to Kats and Thisse’s [1992] class o ...
... class of games with unique Nash equilibria. We did not expect much as these conditions are rather simple, but to our surprise, our program returned a condition that is more general than the strict competitiveness condition. As it turned out, it exactly corresponds to Kats and Thisse’s [1992] class o ...
Team-Maxmin Equilibria
... adversary can select both with positive probability. If the mixed strategy of the second team player is fixed at q, then the expected payoff to the first team player is a linear function of his strategy p, namely 196 y 45 p for T and 176 q 47 p for B. Therefore, in order to obtain an equilibrium whe ...
... adversary can select both with positive probability. If the mixed strategy of the second team player is fixed at q, then the expected payoff to the first team player is a linear function of his strategy p, namely 196 y 45 p for T and 176 q 47 p for B. Therefore, in order to obtain an equilibrium whe ...
Question 2
... demand curve for its output given by p = a - b*y where p and y denote the price and quantity of its output and where a and b are given below. Suppose that the cost function of the firm is given by C(y) = c + d*y where c and d are given below. Assume that the monopolist always has to pay its fixed co ...
... demand curve for its output given by p = a - b*y where p and y denote the price and quantity of its output and where a and b are given below. Suppose that the cost function of the firm is given by C(y) = c + d*y where c and d are given below. Assume that the monopolist always has to pay its fixed co ...
