Nash equilibrium, rational expectations, and heterogeneous beliefs
... is a particular kind of pooling: each type of a player cannot perfectly identify the conditional distribution over the other’s types, conditional on the action that she is taking, but she could identify this conditional distribution had she taken the other action. This is true for each type of each ...
... is a particular kind of pooling: each type of a player cannot perfectly identify the conditional distribution over the other’s types, conditional on the action that she is taking, but she could identify this conditional distribution had she taken the other action. This is true for each type of each ...
Game Theory Basics I: Strategic Form Games1
... Sontag and Drew (1998) reported that a captain of the USS Lapon used dice in order to randomize. Curiously, it is a plot point in Clancy (1984), a classic military techno-thriller, that a (fictional) top Russian submarine commander was predictable when clearing the baffles of his submarine. 2. Empi ...
... Sontag and Drew (1998) reported that a captain of the USS Lapon used dice in order to randomize. Curiously, it is a plot point in Clancy (1984), a classic military techno-thriller, that a (fictional) top Russian submarine commander was predictable when clearing the baffles of his submarine. 2. Empi ...
Advanced Microeconomics (ES30025)
... These specify the order of play, the information and choices available to every player when it is his turn to play, the payoffs to the players, and (sometimes) the probability of moves by nature – see Figure 1: Note: Each ‘node’ represents a point in the game where a player needs to make a decision. ...
... These specify the order of play, the information and choices available to every player when it is his turn to play, the payoffs to the players, and (sometimes) the probability of moves by nature – see Figure 1: Note: Each ‘node’ represents a point in the game where a player needs to make a decision. ...
Cournot-Nash equilibrium
... That means if a player stands at a price or output position, the other player will not get his correspondently best payoff when he chooses different strategy. Thus, to find a game solution or equilibrium is not a maximum problem, but a peculiar and disconcerting mixture of several conflicting sub-ma ...
... That means if a player stands at a price or output position, the other player will not get his correspondently best payoff when he chooses different strategy. Thus, to find a game solution or equilibrium is not a maximum problem, but a peculiar and disconcerting mixture of several conflicting sub-ma ...
Example John Strategy Box Ballet Box (2, 1) ← (0, 0) Marry
... In Case (iib) we can proceed similarly. In Case (iic) we have (u∗ , v ∗ ) = (u0 , v0 ); if it would be u > u0 , then Case (iib) would hold, for v > v0 it would be the Case (iia), which is again a contradiction. ...
... In Case (iib) we can proceed similarly. In Case (iic) we have (u∗ , v ∗ ) = (u0 , v0 ); if it would be u > u0 , then Case (iib) would hold, for v > v0 it would be the Case (iia), which is again a contradiction. ...
Existence and computation of equilibria of first
... Next, we consider the case of independent, identically distributed, private valuations (we call these p.i.i.d. auctions). These fit in the general framework as follows: The states of the world are M = V n where n is the number of bidders and V the set of valuations; the probability distribution on M ...
... Next, we consider the case of independent, identically distributed, private valuations (we call these p.i.i.d. auctions). These fit in the general framework as follows: The states of the world are M = V n where n is the number of bidders and V the set of valuations; the probability distribution on M ...
pdf
... strongly dominated strategies. Thus, the characterization of rationalizability in Theorem 3.2 is also a characterization of strategies that survive iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies. As a result, common belief of rationality is always consistent—that is, every finite game has a stru ...
... strongly dominated strategies. Thus, the characterization of rationalizability in Theorem 3.2 is also a characterization of strategies that survive iterated deletion of strongly dominated strategies. As a result, common belief of rationality is always consistent—that is, every finite game has a stru ...