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History  Caused by Bacillus anthracis  Human zoonotic disease  Spores found in soil worldwide  Primarily disease of herbivorous animals  Sheep, goats, cattle  Many large documented epizootics  Occasional human disease  Epidemics have occurred but uncommon  Rare in developed world Epidemiology  Three forms of natural disease  Inhalational  Rare (<5%)  Most likely encountered in bioterrorism event  Cutaneous  Most common (95%)  Direct contact of spores on skin  Gastrointestinal  Rare (<5%), never reported in U.S.  Ingestion  All ages and genders affected  Occurs worldwide  Endemic areas - Africa, Asia  True incidence not known  World 20,000-100,000 in 1958  U.S. 235 total reported cases 1955-1994  18 cases inhalational since 1900, last one 1976  Until 2001, last previous case cutaneous 1992  Mortality  Inhalational 86-100% (despite treatment)  Era of crude intensive supportive care  Cutaneous <5% (treated) – 20% (untreated)  GI approaches 100%  Incubation Period  Time from exposure to symptoms  Very variable for inhalational  2-43 days reported  Theoretically may be up to 100 days  Delayed germination of spores  Human cases – historical risk factors  Agricultural  Exposure to livestock  Occupational  Exposure to wool and hides  Woolsorter’s disease = inhalational anthrax  Rarely laboratory-acquired  Transmission  No human-to-human  Naturally occurring cases  Skin exposure  Ingestion  Airborne  Bioterrorism  Aerosol (likely)  Small volume powder (possible)  Foodborne (unlikely)  Transmission  Cutaneous  Handling hides/skins of infected animals  Bites from arthropods (very rare)  Handling powdered form in letters, etc.  Intentional aerosol release  May see some cutaneous if large-scale Microbiology  Bacillus anthracis  Aerobic, Gram positive rod  Long (1-10μm), thin (0.5-2.5μm)  Forms inert spores when exposed to O2  Infectious form, hardy  Approx 1μm in size  Vegetative bacillus state in vivo  Result of spore germination  Non-infectious, fragile  Classification  Same family: B. cereus, B. thuringiensis  Differentiation from other Bacillus species  Non-motile  Non β-hemolytic on blood agar  Does not ferment salicin  Note: Gram positive rods are usually labeled as “contaminants” by micro labs  Environmental Survival  Spores are hardy  Resistant to drying, boiling <10 minutes  Survive for years in soil  Still viable for decades in perma-frost  Favorable soil factors for spore viability  High moisture  Organic content  Alkaline pH  High calcium concentration  Transmission  Inhalational  Handling hides/skins of infected animals  Microbiology laboratory  Intentional aerosol release  Small volume powdered form  In letters, packages, etc  Questionable risk, probably small  Transmission  Gastrointestinal  Ingestion of meat from infected animal  Ingestion of intentionally contaminated food  Not likely in large scale  Spores not as viable in large volumes of water  Ingestion from powder-contaminated hands  Inhalational of spores on particles >5 m  Land in oropharynx  Virulence Factors  All necessary for full virulence  Two plasmids  Capsule (plasmid pXO2)  Antiphagocytic  3 Exotoxin components (plasmid pXO1)  Protective Antigen  Edema Factor  Lethal Factor  Protective Antigen  Binds Edema Factor to form Edema Toxin  Facilitates entry of Edema Toxin into cells  Edema Factor  Massive edema by increasing intracellular cAMP  Also inhibits neutrophil function  Lethal Factor  Stimulates macrophage release of TNF-α, IL-1β  Initiates cascade of events leading to sepsis Pathogenesis  Disease requires entry of spores into body  Exposure does not always cause disease  Inoculation dose  Route of entry  Host immune status  May depend on pathogen strain characteristics  Forms of natural disease  Inhalational  Cutaneous  Gastrointestinal  Determined by route of entry  Disease occurs wherever spores germinate Pathogenesis.  Inhalational  Spores on particles 1-5 m  Inhaled and deposited into alveoli  Estimated LD50 = 2500 – 55,000 spores  Dose required for lethal infection in 50% exposed  Contained in imperceptibly small volume  Inhalational  Phagocytosed by alveolar macrophages  Migration to mediastinal/hilar lymph nodes  Germination into vegetative bacilli  Triggered by nutrient-rich environment  May be delayed up to 60 days  Factors not completely understood  Dose, host factors likely play a role  Antibiotic exposure may contribute  Delayed germination after antibiotic suppression  Vegetative bacillus is the virulent phase  Active toxin production  Hemorrhagic necrotizing mediastinitis  Hallmark of inhalational anthrax  Manifests as widened mediastinum on CXR  Does NOT cause pneumonia  Followed by high-grade bacteremia  Seeding of multiple organs, including meninges  Toxin production  Has usually begun by time of early symptoms  Stimulates cascade of inflammatory mediators  Sepsis  Multiorgan failure  DIC  Eventual cause of death  Symptoms mark critical mass of bacterial burden  Usually irreversible by this time  Clearance of bacteria unhelpful as toxin-mediated Pathogenesis of cutaneous form.  Cutaneous  Spores in contact with skin  Entry through visible cuts or microtrauma  Germination in skin  Disease begins following germination  Toxin production  Local edema, erythema, necrosis, lymphocytic infiltrate  No abscess or suppurative lesions  Eventual eschar formation  . In cutaneous anthrax, a malignant pustule develops at the infection site. This pustule is a central area of coagulation necrosis (ulcer) surrounded by a rim of vesicles filled with bloody or clear fluid. A black eschar forms at the ulcer site. Extensive edema surrounds the lesion.  The organisms multiply locally and may spread to the bloodstream or other organs (eg, spleen) via the efferent lymphatics. B anthracis remains in the capillaries of invaded organs, and the local and fatal effects of the infection are due, in large part, to the toxins elaborated by B anthracis.  Dissemination from the liver, spleen, and kidneys back into the bloodstream may result in bacteremia. Secondary hemorrhagic intestinal foci of anthrax result from B anthracis bacteremia.  Cutaneous  Systemic disease  Can occur, especially if untreated  Spores/bacteria carried to regional lymph nodes  Lymphangitis/lymphadenitis  Same syndrome as inhalational  Sepsis, multiorgan failure Pathogenisis GI form  Gastrointestinal  Spores contact mucosa  Oropharynx  Ingestion  Aerosolized particles >5 m  Intestinal mucosa – terminal ileum, cecum  Ingestion  Larger number of spores required for disease  Incubation period 2-5 days  Gastrointestinal  Spores migrate to lymphatics  Submucosal, mucosal lymphatic tissue  Mesenteric nodes  Germination to vegetative bacilli  Toxin production  Massive mucosal edema  Mucosal ulcers, necrosis  Death from perforation or systemic disease Oropharyngeal anthrax  Oropharyngeal anthrax is a variant of intestinal anthrax and occurs in the oropharynx after ingestion of meat products contaminated by anthrax. Oropharyngeal anthrax is characterized by throat pain and difficulty in swallowing. The lesion at the site of entry into the oropharynx resembles the cutaneous ulcer. Clinical Features  Symptoms depend on form of disease  Inhalational  Cutaneous  Gastrointestinal Inhalational  Asymptomatic incubation period  Duration 2-43 days, ~10 days in Sverdlovsk  Prodromal phase  Correlates with germination, toxin production  Nonspecific flu-like symptoms  Fever, malaise, myalgias  Dyspnea, nonproductive cough, mild chest discomfort  Duration several hours to ~3 days  Can have transient resolution before next phase  Fulminant Phase  Correlates with high-grade bacteremia/toxemia  Critically Ill  Fever, diaphoresis  Respiratory distress/failure, cyanosis  Septic shock, multiorgan failure, DIC  50% develop hemorrhagic meningitis  Headache, meningismus, delirium, coma  May be most prominent finding  Usually progresses to death in <36 hrs  Mean time from symptom onset to death ~3 days Laboratory Findings  Gram positive bacilli in direct blood smear  Electrolyte imbalances common  Radiographic Findings  Widened mediastinum  Minimal or no infiltrates  Can appear during prodrome phase Cutaneous  Most common areas of exposure  Hands/arms  Neck/head  Incubation period  3-5 days typical  12 days maximum  Cutaneous – progression of painless lesions Papule – pruritic Vesicle/bulla Ulcer – contains organisms, sig. edema Eschar – black, rarely scars  Systemic disease may develop  Lymphangitis and lymphadenopathy  If untreated, can progress to sepsis, death Gastrointestinal  Oropharyngeal  Oral or esophageal ulcer  Regional lymphadenopathy  Edema, ascites  Sepsis  Abdominal  Early symptoms - nausea, vomiting, malaise  Late - hematochezia, acute abdomen, ascites Diagnosis.  Early diagnosis is difficult  Non specific symptoms  Initially mild  No readily available rapid specific tests  Presumptive diagnosis  History of possible exposure  Typical signs & symptoms  Rapidly progressing nonspecific illness  Widened mediastinum on CXR  Large Gram+ bacilli from specimens  Can be seen on Gram stain if hi-grade bacteremia  Appropriate colonial morphology  Necrotizing mediastinitis, meningitis at autopsy  Definitive diagnosis  Direct culture on standard blood agar     Gold standard, widely available Alert lab to work up Gram + bacilli if found 6-24 hours to grow Sensitivity depends on severity, prior antibiotic  Blood, fluid from skin lesions, pleural fluid, CSF, ascites  Sputum unlikely to be helpful (not a pneumonia)  Very high specificity if non-motile, non-hemolytic  Requires biochemical tests for >99% confirmation  Available at Reference laboratories  Other diagnostic tests  Anthraxin skin test  Chemical extract of nonpathogenic B. anthracis  Subdermal injection  82% sensitivity for cases within 3 days symptoms  99% sensitivity 4 weeks after symptom onset  Testing for exposure  Nasal swabs  Can detect spores prior to illness  Currently used only as epidemiologic tool  Decision based on exposure risk  May be useful for antibiotic sensitivity in exposed  Culture on standard media  Swabs of nares and facial skin  Serologies  May be useful from epidemiologic standpoint  Investigational – only available at CDC Differential diagnostics Inhalational  Influenza  Pneumonia  Community-acquired  Atypical  Pneumonic tularemia  Pneumonic plague  Mediastinitis  Bacterial meningitis  Thoracic aortic aneurysm Expect if anthrax Flu rapid diagnostic – More severe in young pts No infiltrate No prior surgery Bloody CSF with GPBs Fever  Cutaneous  Spider bite  Ecthyma gangrenosum  Pyoderma gangrenosum  Ulceroglandular tularemia  Mycobacterial ulcer  Cellulitis Expect if anthrax fever no response to 3º cephs painless, black eschar +/- lymphadenopathy usually sig. local edema  Gastrointestinal  Gastroenteritis  Typhoid  Peritonitis  Perforated ulcer  Bowel obstruction Expect if anthrax Critically ill Acute abdomen Bloody diarrhea Fever Treatment.  Hospitalization  IV antibiotics  Empiric until sensitivities are known  Intensive supportive care  Electrolyte and acid-base imbalances  Mechanical ventilation  Hemodynamic support  Antibiotic selection  Naturally occurring strains  Rare penicillin resistance, but inducible βlactamase  Penicillins, aminoglycosides, tetracyclines, erythromycin, chloramphenicol have been effective  Ciprofloxacin very effective in vitro, animal studies  Other fluoroquinolones probably effective  Engineered strains  Known penicillin, tetracycline resistance  Highly resistant strains = mortality of untreated  Empiric Therapy  Until susceptibility patterns known  Adults  Ciprofloxacin 400 mg IV q12° OR Doxycycline 100mg IV q12° AND (for inhalational) One or two other antibiotics  Pregnant women  Same as other adults  Weigh small risks (fetal arthropathy) vs benefit  Immunosuppressed  same as other adults  Susceptibility testing should be done  Narrow antibiotic if possible  Must be cautious  Multiple strains with engineered resistance to different antibiotics may be coinfecting  Watch for clinical response after switching antibiotic  Antibiotic therapy  Duration  60 days  Risk of delayed spore germination  Vaccine availability  Could reduce to 30-45 days therapy  Stop antibiotics after 3rd vaccine dose  Switch to oral  Clinical improvement  Patient able to tolerate oral medications  Other therapies  Passive immunization  Anthrax immunoglobulin from horse serum  Risk of serum sickness  Antitoxin  Mutated Protective Antigen  Blocks cell entry of toxin  Still immunogenic, could be an alternative vaccine  Animal models promising Postexposure Prophylaxis  Who should receive PEP?  Anyone exposed to anthrax  Not for contacts of cases, unless also exposed  Empiric antibiotic therapy  Vaccination  Avoid unnecessary antibiotic usage  Potential shortages of those who need them  Potential adverse effects  Hypersensitivity  Neurological side effects, especially elderly  Bone/cartilage disease in children  Oral contraceptive failure  Future antibiotic resistance  Individual’s own flora  Community resistance patterns Post exposure prophylaxis.  Antibiotic therapy  Treat ASAP  Prompt therapy can improve survival  Continue for 60 days  30-45 days if vaccine administered  Antibiotic therapy  Same regimen as active treatment  Substituting oral equivalent for IV  Ciprofloxacin 500 mg po bid empirically  Alternatives  Doxycycline 100 mg po bid  Amoxicillin 500 mg po tid Prevention.  Vaccine  Anthrax Vaccine Adsorpbed (AVA)  Supply  Limited, controlled by CDC  Production problems  Single producer – Bioport, Michigan  Failed FDA standards  None produced since 1998  Vaccine  Inactivated, cell-free filtrate  Adsorbed onto Al(OH)3  Protective Antigen  Immunogenic component  Necessary but not sufficient  Vaccine  Administration  Dose schedule  0, 2 & 4 wks; 6, 12 & 18 months initial series  Annual booster  0.5 ml SQ  Vaccine  Adverse Effects  >1.6 million doses given to military by 4/2000  No deaths  <10% moderate/severe local reactions  Erythema, edema  <1% systemic reactions  Fever, malaise Infection control.  No person to person transmission  Standard Precautions  Laboratory safety  Biosafety Level (BSL) 2 Precautions Decontamination.  Skin, clothing  Thorough washing with soap and water  Avoid bleach on skin  Instruments for invasive procedures  Sterilize, e.g. 5% hypochlorite solution  Sporicidal agents  Sodium or calcium hypochlorite (bleach)
 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
									 
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                             
                                            