Download DBQ: Cuban Missile Crisis

Name:______________________________ Date: ________
U.S. History
Unit #9
The Cold War
Communication during the Cuban Missile Crisis
There are five documents for this assignment and five questions to answer following the
appropriate documents.
Subject: The Cuban Missile Crisis
These questions refer to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The accompanying documents are above.
(a) What, according to Source A, was the significance of the Soviet military
1. buildup on Cuba?
(b) What message is conveyed by Source B?
2. Compare and contrast the views about the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis
expressed in Sources C and D.
3. With reference to their origin and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of
Source C and Source E for historians studying the Cuban Missile Crisis.
4. Using these sources and your own knowledge, analyze the importance of SovietU.S. communication during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Sources have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets
[ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses (...); minor changes are not
indicated.
Source A: President John F. Kennedy’s television and radio address, October 22, 1962.
Good Evening, My Fellow Citizens:
This government, as promised, has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the
island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of
offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be
none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.
First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to
Cuba is being initiated…
Third: It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any
nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response
upon the Soviet Union.
Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and
provocative threat to world peace… He has an opportunity now to move the world back from the abyss of
destruction.
1(a) What, according to Source A, was the significance of the Soviet military buildup on Cuba?
Highlight text and form sentences to answer the question AS IT IS ASKED (12%)
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Source B: Editorial Cartoon, Karl Hubenthal, 1962
1. (b) What message is conveyed by Source B? (Note title, symbols, characters and cartoonist’s
POV)—8%
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Source C: Translation of Telegram From Khrushchev to Kennedy sent from the Embassy in the Soviet Union
to the Department of State, Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.
Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for
Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its
forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the
necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.
Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared
the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man
simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.
If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to
us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive
what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in
which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied.
And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the
strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to
explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.
Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe
of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take
measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.
Source D: Dobrynin's Cable to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 27 October, 1962
Late tonight R. Kennedy invited me to come see him. We talked alone.
The Cuban crisis, R. Kennedy began, continues to quickly worsen. We have just received a report that an
unarmed American plane was shot down while carrying out a reconnaissance flight over Cuba. The military is
demanding that the President arm such planes and respond to fire with fire. The USA government will have to
do this.
I interrupted R. Kennedy and asked him, what right American planes had to fly over Cuba at all, crudely
violating its sovereignty and accepted international norms? How would the USA have reacted if foreign planes
appeared over its territory?
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"In this regard," R. Kennedy said, "the president considers that a suitable basis for regulating the entire Cuban
conflict might be the letter N.S. Khrushchev sent on October 26 and the letter in response from the President,
which was sent off today to N.S. Khrushchev through the US Embassy in Moscow. The most important thing
for us," R. Kennedy stressed, "is to get as soon as possible the agreement of the Soviet government to halt
further work on the construction of the missile bases in Cuba and take measures under international control
that would make it impossible to use these weapons. In exchange the government of the USA is ready, in
addition to repealing all measures on the "quarantine," to give the assurances that there will not be any
invasion of Cuba and that other countries of the Western Hemisphere are ready to give the same assurancesthe US government is certain of this."
"And what about Turkey?" I asked R. Kennedy.
"If that is the only obstacle to achieving the regulation I mentioned earlier, then the president doesn't see any
unsurmountable difficulties in resolving this issue," replied R. Kennedy. "The greatest difficulty for the
president is the public discussion of the issue of Turkey. Formally the deployment of missile bases in Turkey
was done by a special decision of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral decision by the president of
the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey-this would damage the entire structure of NATO and the US
position as the leader of NATO, where, as the Soviet government knows very well, there are many arguments.
In short, if such a decision were announced now it would seriously tear apart NATO."
"However, President Kennedy is ready to come to agree on that question with N.S. Khrushchev, too. I think
that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey," R. Kennedy said, "we need 4-5 months. This is the
minimal amount of time necessary for the US government to do this, taking into account the procedures that
exist within the NATO framework. On the whole Turkey issue," R. Kennedy added, "if Premier N.S. Khrushchev
agrees with what I've said, we can continue to exchange opinions between him and the president, using him,
R. Kennedy and the Soviet ambassador. "However, the president can't say anything public in this regard about
Turkey," R. Kennedy said again. R. Kennedy then warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely
confidential; besides him and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington.
"That's all that he asked me to pass on to N.S. Khrushchev," R. Kennedy said in conclusion. "The president also
asked N.S. Khrushchev to give him an answer (through the Soviet ambassador and R. Kennedy) if possible
within the next day (Sunday) on these thoughts in order to have a business-like, clear answer in principle. [He
asked him] not to get into a wordy discussion, which might drag things out. The current serious situation,
unfortunately, is such that there is very little time to resolve this whole issue. Unfortunately, events are
developing too quickly. The request for a reply tomorrow," stressed R. Kennedy, "is just that-a request, and
not an ultimatum. The president hopes that the head of the Soviet government will understand him correctly."
I noted that it went without saying that the Soviet government would not accept any ultimatums and it was
good that the American government realized that. I also reminded him of N.S. Khrushchev's appeal in his last
letter to the president to demonstrate state wisdom in resolving this question. Then I told R. Kennedy that the
president's thoughts would be brought to the attention of the head of the Soviet government. I also said that I
would contact him as soon as there was a reply. In this regard, R. Kennedy gave me a number of a direct
telephone line to the White House.
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I should say that during our meeting R. Kennedy was very upset; in any case, I've never seen him like this
before. True, about twice he tried to return to the topic of "deception," (that he talked about so persistently
during our previous meeting), but he did so in passing and without any edge to it. He didn't even try to get
into fights on various subjects, as he usually does, and only persistently returned to one topic: time is of the
essence and we shouldn't miss the chance.
After meeting with me he immediately went to see the president, with whom, as R. Kennedy said, he spends
almost all his time now.
2. Compare and contrast the views about the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis expressed
in Sources C and D. Complete the Venn Diagram before writing. 24%
C+D
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Contrasting: __________________________________________________________________
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Source C: Translation of Telegram From Khrushchev to Kennedy sent from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to
the Department of State, Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m. REPEATED FOR QUESTION #3
Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for
Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its
forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the
necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.
Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared
the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man
simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.
If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to
us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive
what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in
which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied.
And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the
strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to
explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.
Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe
of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take
measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.
Source E: US, Department of Justice, Memorandum, TOP SECRET, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State
from the Attorney General,” on Robert Kennedy’s October 27 Meeting with Dobrynin, October 30, 1962.
3. With reference to their origin and purpose, discuss the value and limitations of Source C and
Source E for historians studying the Cuban Missile Crisis. In other words, how does who,
where, and why the document was written effect how valuable it is as a source on the topic,
and why it may not be so good to use for the topic. 24%
Source C: ____________________________________________________________________
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Source E: _____________________________________________________________________
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January 1, 1959
December 19,
1960
Fidel Castro assumes power after the Cuban Revolution.
Cuba openly aligns itself with the Soviet Union and their policies.
January 3, 1961
The U.S. terminates diplomatic and consular relation with Cuba.
April 12, 1961
President Kennedy pledges the U.S. will not intervene militarily to overthrow
Castro.
April 17, 1961
Backed by the U.S., a group of Cuban exiles invades Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in
an attempt to trigger an anti-Castro rebellion. The invasion fails and more than
a thousand Cuban rebels are captured by Castro's forces.
June 3-4, 1961
Khrushchev and Kennedy hold summit in Vienna.
July 27, 1962
Castro announces that Cuba is taking measures that would make any direct
U.S. attack on Cuba the equivalent of a world war. He claims that the U.S.S.R.
has invested greatly in helping defend his country.
August 10, 1962
CIA Director John McCone sends a memo to Kennedy expressing his belief that
Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) will be deployed in Cuba
August 31, 1962
Senator Kenneth Keating tells the Senate that there is evidence of Soviet
missile installations in Cuba. Keating urges Kennedy to take action.
September 11,
1962
In a speech to the UN, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko warns that an
American attack on Cuba could mean war with the Soviet Union.
October 9, 1962
Kennedy orders a U-2 reconnaissance flight over western Cuba, delayed by bad
weather until the 14th.
October 10, 1962
Senator Keating charges that six intermediate-range ballistic missile bases are
being constructed in Cuba.
October 14, 1962
A U-2 flying over western Cuba discovers missile sites. Photographs obtained
by this flight provide hard evidence that Soviets have missiles in Cuba.
October 15, 1962
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October 16, 1962
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A readout team at the National Photographic Intelligence Center reviews
photos taken during the U-2 flight and identifies objects similar to MRBM
components observed in the U.S.S.R. at San Cristobal.
McGeorge Bundy decides after hearing about the discovery of missiles in
Cuba not to inform the president until the next day.
McNamara is shown the photographic evidence of the MRBMs at San
Cristobal.
Bundy breaks the new to Kennedy who calls for a meeting of a group later
to become known as EX-COMM.
At that meeting Kennedy and his advisors discuss possible diplomatic and
military courses of action.
October 17, 1962
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Kennedy flies to Connecticut to campaign for the Democratic Party and
congressional candidate Abe Ribicoff.
Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen meet the President at the airport
and fill him in on what he had missed during that day's deliberations.
Throughout EX-COMM's discussions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and especially
the Air Force strongly argue for an air strike.
After another U-2 flight on the night of the 17th, the military discovers
intermediate range (IRBMs) SS-5 nuclear missiles.
October 18, 1962
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Gromyko and Kennedy meet for two hours. Reading from notes, Gromyko
assures Kennedy that Soviet aid to Cuba has been only for the "defensive
capabilities of Cuba."
October 19, 1962
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Kennedy departs Washington for scheduled campaign speeches in
Cleveland and the West Coast.
October 20, 1962
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Kennedy's Press Secretary announces that the President is canceling the
remainder of his campaign trip because of an "upper respiratory infection."
Kennedy meets with his advisors and orders a defensive quarantine
instituted as soon as possible. The full operation is reviewed and approved,
and the President's television address is scheduled for the next evening.
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October 21, 1962
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October 22, 1962
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October 23, 1962
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Kennedy is told by General Maxwell Taylor that an air strike could not
guarantee to destroy all Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Kennedy decides on a quarantine of Cuba for the time being.
Kennedy requests that the press not deny him the "element of surprise" or
he warns, "I don't know what the Soviets will do."
Another U-2 flight that day reveals bombers and Migs being rapidly
assembled and cruise missile sites being built on Cuba's northern shore.
Congressional leaders assemble at the White House for a meeting with
Kennedy. They are shown the photographic evidence of the Soviet missile
installations. The congressional leaders express support, but many
advocate stronger action.
The President addresses the nation in a televised speech, announcing the
presence of offensive missile sites in Cuba.
U.S. military forces go to DEFCON 3.
U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay is reinforced by Marines.
Kennedy orders six Crusader jets to fly a low level reconnaissance mission.
Organization of American States (OAS) unanimously approves of the
quarantine against Cuba.
By the end of the day U.S. ships had taken up position along the quarantine
line, 800 miles from Cuba.
Late in the evening, the President sends Robert Kennedy to the Soviet
embassy to talk with Ambassador Dobrynin.
Kennedy receives a letter from Khrushchev in which Khrushchev comments
that there is a, "serious threat to peace and security of peoples."
October 24, 1962
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President decides to give Khrushchev more time and pulls the quarantine
line back to 500 miles.
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Soviet ships en route to Cuba with questionable cargo either slow down or
reverse their course except for one.
Military forces go to DEFCON 2 the highest ever in U.S. history.
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October 25, 1962
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October 26, 1962
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October 27, 1962
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October 28, 1962
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Kennedy sends a letter to Khrushchev laying the responsibility for the crisis
on the Soviet Union.
EX-COMM discusses a proposal to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey in
exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba.
The Soviet ship Marucla is cleared through the quarantine.
During an EX-COMM meeting, Kennedy says that he believes the
quarantine alone can not force the Soviet government to remove its
offensive weapons from Cuba.
A CIA report from that morning states that there was no halt in progress in
the development of the missile sites and another reconnaissance flight
reveals the Soviets were also attempting to camouflage the missiles.
Aleksandr Fomin, who was known to be the KGB station chief in
Washington, requests a meeting with ABC News correspondent John Scali.
Fomin proposes the dismantling of Soviet bases under U.N. supervision in
exchange for a public pledge from the U.S. not to invade Cuba.
Khrushchev sends another letter to Kennedy proposing removing his
missiles if Kennedy would publicly announce never to invade Cuba.
A new letter from Khrushchev arrives, proposing a public trade of Soviet
missiles in Cuba for U.S. missile in Turkey.
An American U-2 is shot down over Cuba killing the pilot, Major Rudolf
Anderson.
U-2 accidentally strays into Soviet airspace near Alaska nearly being
intercepted by Soviet fighters.
Dobrynin and Robert Kennedy meet and discuss the price of removing the
missiles from Cuba.
Kennedy writes Khrushchev a letter stating that he will make a statement
that the U.S. will not invade Cuba if Khrushchev removes the missiles from
Cuba.
Khrushchev announces over Radio Moscow that he has agreed to remove
the missiles from Cuba.
Write a brief paragraph to answer each question below. The questions refer to the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
Paragraph 1: Answer the question: How important was communication during the crisis? Give three reasons why
you gave this analysis.
Paragraph 2: Use one of the three reasons and give details to back up this reason. Include facts, quotations from 23 documents, and other ideas on only this reason.
Paragraph 3: Use another of the three reasons and give details to back up this reason. Include facts, quotations
from 2-3 documents, and other ideas on only this reason.
Paragraph 4: Use the third of the three reasons and give details to back up this reason. Include facts, quotations
from 2-3 documents, and other ideas on only this reason.
Paragraph 5: Summarize your claim and the reasons—do not rewrite the first paragraph or restate it in another way.
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