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What if we cannot philosophize? Jakub Moravčík Havířov, quodlibet seminary 22.11.2014 Přátelé filosofie (Friends of philosophy)/ Filosofický klub 2008 (Philosophical club 2008) Gist of the problem Primary experience: Human seems to be a free being which permanently makes choices It seems that free action has moral dimension. There are criterias of action insofar it´s action – it can be good or bad Also theoretical actions (deducement, thinking, doubting, asking etc.), which we perform during philosophizing, are notnecessary choices, acts – also philosophizing is life, also cognition is action During philosophizing I permanently decide somehow and thus I am not excluded from moral dimension of life. By choosing anything I necesarilly presuppose the good of the chosen – but only presuppose! Resulting questions (s.c. Problem of ethical legitimation of philosophy): - aren´t we dogmatic when we unproblematically philosophize? - aren´t we immoral when we philosophize? Don´t we do evil? Inspiration and motivation Jiří Fuchs: philosophy MUST start with noetics (J.M.: really?) Søren Kierkegaard: we think backwards, but live forward Ethics generally: concrete moral imperatives (concerning also theoretical actions!), moral taboo Determinist´s objection Determinist: the problem presupposes free will. But what if we are completely determined? That´s what we have to identify first! Reply: - no human is naturally born as determinist - also determinist once decided whether he will deal with the problem of free will and determinism, he experienced it as deciding process - determinist doesn´t know if he can philosophize about determinism Attempt to solve of the problem - inspiration took from noetics of Jiří Fuchs - ideal imaginary oponent called „ethical sceptic“ - methodical rule of ethical sceptic: „No action can be performed before its ethical legitimation!“ In our case we will apply this rule mostly to the so called theoretical actions – thinking, debating, thematisation, doubting, deducing, asking etc. - ethical sceptic wants to be a philosopher, not a „violent moralist“ Polemics with the ethical sceptic - whenever we do any (theoretical) action, ethical sceptic will always ask how do we know that we could do it and if we ethically legitimated it - even if we try to show him some legitimation he will ask how do we know that we might show it to him because its showing is also a free action that has to be legitimated. He might have meant his question for legitimation as catch question in order to test us. How to escape from it? - a solution: have the ethical sceptic legitimated his own objecting? If he did not is not he alone dogmatic ? He wants us to do something which he alone cannot do. Ethical sceptic concedes it because he wants to be a philosopher. What we did (not) found out? If philosophy has some obligating methodical starting point, it has to start with the question of goodness, not with the question of truth. Although ethical sceptic did not win we still do not know what we can philosophize about and what not. What now? Optimistic approach: let´s philosophize about anything. Against: moral taboo-makers (E. Anscombe, E. Feser, ...) Problem of moral taboo-makers: what has to be a taboo and what not? Who will decide it? How do we know that the tabooizing will not board the runaway train? Taboo-makers: moral intuitions of western civilization. Against: postmodernists – historical and social conditions. What if the whole solution is wrong? Objection: I have all the time philosophized the topic whether we can philosophize while not knowing that I really can philosophize about it! Reply (partial): philosophizing is not and cannot by completely without presuppositions. And it sometimes cannot start without breaking a taboo. Result: Addendum: a „principle of reasoning“ problem Question: is reasoning act of reason or will? If reason, then the proof of free will from inconsistency of determinist position is invalid, Scotus is right: freedom is independent of reason If will then Descartes is true and mistake = sin Uncomfortable ramifications for free will backers (scotists excluded) „Purely theoretical action“ is the same phrase as „rounded square“ Literature Untortunately only blogs http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/06/can-philosophy-be-polemical.html http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/01/walters-on-tls.html http://kontrafikce.blogspot.com/2014/01/moralni-tabu-meze-diskuze.html http://kontrafikce.blogspot.com/2014/05/zakazuju-zakazujes-zakazujeme.html http://desirabilia.blogspot.com/2013/07/problem-eticke-legitimace-filosofie-15.html http://desirabilia.blogspot.com/2013/08/opravdu-teoreticka-suspenze-eticna.html