Download Are moral values invented or discovered

Are moral values invented or discovered? What importance does this question
have for moral debate and decision-making?
Realism about ethics could be described as the naïve conception of ethics, as ordinary
morality seems to endorse the view that matters of ethics are matters of facts. This is
seen in the language we use to describe moral judgements, the use of the categorical
imperative without recourse to justifications by reasoning or opinions. It is further
corroborated by the strong feeling that attaches itself to moral judgements; in
believing an action to be good, we are committed to it being the right thing to do, not
subject to difference in taste or opinion. However, if we accept that moral facts do
exist independently of us and can be known, we are now faced with some difficult
questions: What kind of facts are these? How do we come to know them? How can
we account for the many examples of disagreement over the facts and come to the
correct view?
John Mackie offers two main arguments against the objectivity of moral values. The
first of these deals with the first two questions raised above, regarding the possible
nature of objective moral values and our access to them. Certainly moral statements
are not ‘about’ things in the more obvious way that statements of science are, and
cannot be verified by empirical evidence save perhaps our own psychological
tendencies. Mackie argues that the ‘queerness’ of moral facts is a good reason to
reject their existence. There are certainly many properties of moral values that no
other facts possess. The realist, to defend his view, must offer some explanation of
how objective facts are able to motivate people to act in the way that moral ones do,
when, as Hume argues, belief itself is motivationally inert. Some realists simply deny
that this is the case, agreeing with Hume that belief must be coupled with a desire to
act. But when we form a moral belief, say that some action is ‘right’, in making the
judgement we are already moved to act. If we disassociate our desire to be moral, or
desire to do the right thing, whatever that specific thing may be, then surely we are
removing some part of the moral judgement we are trying to explain.
Then there is the problem of explaining the connection between natural facts and
moral ones. For it is clear that moral facts are supervenient on natural ones for no two
acts could be naturally identical and yet differ morally. But in what exactly consists
the goodness of an act if this is supervenient on and yet distinct from its natural
components? As Mackie puts it, when saying an act is wrong because it is cruel,
“what in the world is signified by this ‘because’?”
As already mentioned, a realist view of ethics is quite an automatic one, and so to
convincingly reject the doctrine we must offer a plausible alternative. If holding that
there is no objective moral reality, how is it that our linguistic and psychological
tendencies seem to be so in error? Blackburn seeks to show how an apparently realist
language can be explained on a very different ontological basis, something that he
describes as ‘quasi-realism’. According to quasi-realism, statements that appear to
asset an objective truth can be viewed as a “proper, necessary expression of an
attitude to our own attitudes”. Even if this can explain the objectification of moral
values in language, the inclination to ascribe objectivity to moral judgements comes
also from the sense that they are binding upon every person- one cannot opt out of
moral behaviour. If we are to reject realism, and say that morals are of our own
invention, then are we at liberty to disregard them? The idea that we are sacrificing
the notion of obligation is threatening to ordinary morality, as well as hard to
reconcile with the strong feeling of having a moral duty.
In fact, we are at liberty to reject objectivity without real fear for the abandonment of
morals altogether. The sensation of conscience is very real, and its source may be
otherwise explained, by our education, upbringing, and the deep social entrenchment
of moral rules. To suggest that through rational rejection of objectivity we could reject
morality altogether is just as impossible as to suggest that through philosophical
examination of subjectivity in humour we could stop finding things funny. This is not
to say that our sense of duty will be entirely unaffected- our sense of obligation can
certainly diminish with the belief that it is not objectively correct. As much as we
might at first glance seem to trust in the objectivity of our moral beliefs, the
possibility of their being mistaken prevents us from being too forthright in our
imposition of them on others. We are able to privately believe in the ‘rightness’ of our
views while not condemning someone for holding different views, on the grounds that
it is often difficult to discern the correct moral response to something. Similarly, if we
were to hold that there is no such thing as a ‘correct’ response, we would still retain
our preference and commitment to a certain one.
Now we are touching on another of Mackie’s methods of attack, the empirical fact
that people just do hold very different moral views. Some situations are difficult to
assess, and this is usually those in which great harm and great good can be incurred
by both of two different courses of action. Morality covers a broad spectrum of types
of action, and we are willing to recognise differing degrees of wrongness and
rightness, and further recognise that these are frequently incommensurable. This itself
should not trouble the realist, for if we are to hold that moral values exist, I have
already shown that we must acknowledge their peculiar nature, and the difficulty of
explaining our access to them. That disagreements exist does not belie the possibility
of there being a right answer, however difficult it may be to identify.
But let us look at cases that are not so hard to assess. Rather than talking about
disagreements between individuals, let us examine variance between cultures. There
are some practises that in Western society would be considered fully abhorrent, but
that remain an integral part of other cultures, specifically the practise of female
circumcision in many parts of Africa. The ritual mutilation of girls’ genitals is hardly
a matter of contention for ordinary western morality, it is clearly condemnable. Yet
this remains standard practise in many countries, and it is not a case of forcible
oppression of women, rather it is morally accepted and usually carried out by other
women. Now the western realist must hold that this is morally corrupt, and so is
forced to say that these cultures are just mistaken. That they have failed (or not yet
managed) to discover the correct moral nature of female genital mutilation. An
alternative, and more satisfying, explanation is that their moral rules have simply
developed in a different way to those of Western societies, in response to the
combination of factors that influence any society’s development, such as
environment, politics, or religion. We may strongly believe in the superiority of our
own ethical code, but this can be seen as a product of its deep entrenchment in our
culture. Systems of ethics are not static, rather they evolve over time, albeit very
slowly; certain things are outlawed as morality shifts, and things which were once
considered strongly immoral begin to be accepted. Of course this does not preclude
the possibility that what they evolve towards is some kind of objectively correct
standard. But I don’t think there is any motivation to believe this, given the already
cited difficulties of elucidating the strange nature of this objective reality.
Of course there are some values about which there is no discord, such as the killing of
innocent people. Even those values have been disregarded in the past, for example in
the religious sacrifice of humans, but I am not suggesting that we are not justified in
strongly holding to these basic values. We simply do have strong faith in our own
moral beliefs, and as such I feel we remain entitled to consider current morality an
‘improvement’ on past ideas. There are plenty of things which are created rather than
discovered by humans and yet the value of which is strongly advocated. Moreover,
the non-objectivist does not have to refrain from propagating their own moral views,
or refrain from criticising practises they find abhorrent such as FGM. It is not
contradictory to believe that your morals are not objective, and still want others to
conform to them, as it is a part of their nature that you strongly prefer them, and
indeed feel obliged to uphold them. As already stated, there may be some less drive to
try and impose them, and this is currently reflected in the way people do refrain from
interfering with cultural practises they disagree with.
Mackie seems to regard his error theory as having no implications for a change in the
practise of ethics. Blackburn draws a comparison with mathematics on this point,
saying that one could be an anti-realist about mathematical objects without ever
doubting that 7+5 really is 12. Actually this is not a good analogy, as anti-realism in
mathematics does lead to a great change in its practise- intuitionists have reformulated
logic and mathematics according to their philosophy of its foundations, and
consequently rejected whole fields of classical mathematics. Most working
mathematicians are realists for this very reason. To reject normal morality on the basis
of philosophising into its ontology is far less possible. The urge to preserve classical
mathematics for most people is not as strong as the urge to preserve morality; any
subject so intimately connected with peoples’ psychology and emotive responses is
far less open to revision on the basis of reasoning.
Realism about ethics faces many challenges, and there are significantly different
answers to these even within this doctrine. Issues include whether moral facts are
natural, or in what sense they depend on natural facts; the epistemological difficulties
in accounting for our knowledge of this ‘queer’ subject matter, and finally the
fundamental ways in which moralities can differ, which are apparently contingent on
social and cultural differences. The naïve view looks less and less appealing,
especially when we consider the ways in which the linguistic and psychological
tendencies upon which it is founded can be explained without objectivity. Reluctance
to call morals subjective can be motivated by the fear that lack of objectivity means
removal of obligation, but this would not be the case. That moral values are invented
rather than discovered does not make a significant change to ordinary practise of
moral reasoning. Tolerance for cultural differences already exists, even when these
offend some of our moral views; the cases in which we don’t accept differing
moralities are ones of very basic, core values, that are upheld by most societies even if
not by all individuals. Furthermore it is perfectly possible to accept that these are
products of human invention, and yet feel just as strongly about our duty to uphold
them.