Download Does Inclusion Require Democracy?

P OL I T I C A L S T UD IES: 2003 VO L 51, 197–214
Does Inclusion Require Democracy?
Adam James Tebble
London School of Economics
Iris Marion Young’s theory of democracy aims to accommodate the idea of difference by combining anti-essentialist, identity conferring social groups and mediated socio-economic relations. In
this way they are supposed to combine instrumental rationality with inclusiveness and the recognition of difference. Using the political thought of F.A. Hayek, this paper mounts a critique of
Young’s difference theory. In particular it argues that Young’s theory of group representation at
the institutional level of politics contradicts her commitment to an anti-essentialist account of
groups. Whereas her account of group identity is necessarily fluid and inclusive, her account of
recognition is rigid and exclusionary. Furthermore the epistemological demands of democratic
communication and economic coordination undermine her instrumental account of publicdecision making. In contrast it will be argued that Hayek’s political thought provides instructive
alternative way of addressing the tensions at the heart of Young’s theory.
Recently, the theory of justice has witnessed the emergence of the multicultural
perspective as one of the principal rivals to liberalism. In Culture and Equality Brian
Barry has claimed that this development can be traced historically to the demise
of communism in the late 1980s and the political vacuum created by its departing
(Barry, 2001, pp. 3–5). In the countries where central planning failed, Barry claims,
there has arisen the often-ugly politics of ethnic nationalism. By contrast, in the
‘post-socialist’ age the West has witnessed a less extreme form of this trend in the
emergence of multiculturalism, or the politics of recognition, that in many cases
has taken inspiration from the new social movements of the left that arose in the
1970s (Benhabib, 1996, p. 14; Fraser, 1996a, p. 4). In the academy, one of the more
prominent defenders of this position – and one whose theory Barry seeks to reject
– is Iris Marion Young.
Although I generally agree with Barry’s historical account, the aims of this paper
are different to and far less ambitious than those of Culture and Equality. Rather
than claiming that the multicultural project is but an unwelcome distraction from
more important distributive concerns, the principal aim here is not to reject, or
accept, multiculturalism or the politics of recognition per se, but to examine closely
the thought of one of its more important defenders.1 More specifically, I will be
concerned with Young’s elaboration of difference democracy as the institutional
conclusion of the ethical and instrumental requirements of the politics of difference and will seek to show that, to the extent that they ought to be satisfied at all,
the aspirations of the politics of difference are not best satisfied by difference democracy. It is here, moreover, where Barry’s concern with recent historical developments becomes salient, for I will claim further that the epistemological arguments
against central planning advanced in the twentieth century by thinkers such as
Hayek not only help to explain why the socialist politics that theories such as the
© Political Studies Association, 2003.
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politics of difference have perhaps replaced did indeed fail. Provided adjustments
are made, such arguments may be invoked today to critique theories such as
Young’s.
In this paper, I will briefly describe the two central notions of Young’s critical and
normative projects: the conception of social groups and socioeconomic mediation.
After drawing parallels between the thought of Hayek and Young, in the second
and third sections, I will offer a Hayekian critique of difference democracy in terms
of the latter’s consistency with these two notions that also takes into account, in
the fourth section, more recent developments in her thought. In response to this
critique, I will outline a new liberal research project premised upon the claim that
if one is to emphasise socio-economic mediation and the embedded, culturally differentiated nature of our identities, then politics should be individualistic and minimally democratic in the Hayekian sense.
Young’s Project
I have discussed in detail elsewhere the role the notions of the social group and
mediated social relations play in Iris Young’s thought (Tebble, 2002). For now,
we may note that whilst social groups are understood as partly constitutive of a
person’s ‘particular sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s
mode of reasoning, evaluating, and expressing feeling’, Young also claims that this
does not entail that they are ontologically real, with readily identifiable essences
(Young, 1990, pp. 45–7).2 Indeed, due to the presence of many different kinds of
social group, the differences between them may cut across one another with the
result that borders ‘will be undecidable’ and ‘there will be much overlap and intermingling’ (Young, 1990, pp. 246–7).3 We may characterise Young’s account, then,
as what Fraser would call a ‘deconstructive version of anti-essentialism’ in which
differences ‘all the way down’ (Fraser, 1996b, pp. 182–3). Secondly, and in contrast to face-to-face relations, central to Young’s account is the notion of mediated
social relations. Such relations are marked by ‘temporal and spatial distancing’
(Young, 1986, p. 15, 1990, p. 227) and, significantly, Young links mediation both
to the structure of urban society and its highly complex division of labour (Young,
1990, pp. 237–8) as well as to the core notion of difference that is defined as the
‘irreducible particularity of entities, which makes it impossible to reduce them to
commonness or bring them into unity without remainder’ (Young, 1986, p. 4).
Similarly to anti-essentialist social groups, then, mediation thwarts the classification of individuals as members of ‘reified’ social collectivities because ‘[m]odern
processes of urbanisation and market economy produce economic interdependencies, the physical intermingling of members of differently-identifying groups in
public places and workplaces, and partial identities cutting across more encompassing group identities’ (Young, 1993a, p. 128).
The Politics of Difference and Democracy
From the account of society arises the conception of the politics of difference that
takes the features of urban relations as a normative ideal (Young, 1986, p. 2, 1990,
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p. 234). At the level of political deliberation this is embodied in the notion of the
heterogeneous public in which ‘differences are publicly recognised and acknowledged as irreducible’ and where ‘persons from one perspective or history can never
completely understand and adopt the point of view of those with other groupdifferentiated perspectives and histories’ (Young, 1989, p. 258, 1997b, p. 51). Thus,
public deliberation ‘requires not principles that apply to all people in the same way,
but a nuanced understanding of the particularities of the social context, and the
needs particular people have and express within it’ (Young, 1990, p. 96). That is,
deliberation must reflect social group-differentiated perspectives via specifically groupdifferentiated public decision-making (Young, 1990, p. 91). Which institutional
form ought this decision-making take? Importantly, the heterogeneous public is
institutionalised via a specifically democratic form of politics.4
Identifying the most appropriate form of democracy is one of the main tasks of
Inclusion and Democracy. It is important to note, however, that Young’s is not an
‘interest-group pluralism’ in which groups compete for government favours along
a dispersed costs/concentrated benefits model. Young criticises interest-group
pluralism in Justice and the Politics of Difference and later in Inclusion and Democracy,
where it is called ‘aggregative democracy’ (Young, 1990, pp. 75–6, 118–9, 2000,
pp. 19–21). The objection is that aggregative democracy does not address the
problem of self-interest in any fundamental way because it begs the question of
the self-interest of special interest groups (Young, 2000, pp. 20–1). Moreover, both
the formation of preferences and the preferences themselves are not subject to
moral scrutiny because they are ‘exogenous to the political process’ and merely
taken as given (Young, 2000, p. 20). Many of these criticisms, of course, are shared
by deliberative and discursive democrats and the advantage of this form of
decision-making is precisely that preferences are endogenous to the political
process because ‘others test and challenge ... proposals and arguments’ and
‘[p]articipants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees
are supported by the best reasons’ (Young, 2000, pp. 22–3, 26, 30).
Yet, despite these similarities, since Justice and the Politics of Difference Young has
also criticised the deliberative democrats’ response to diversity. By extending the
arguments deployed elsewhere against the ideal of liberal impartiality and the communitarian ideal of community to deliberative democracy (Young, 1993b, 1995,
2000, pp. 36–51).5 Writing with specific reference to Cohen (1989) and Dryzek
(1990), Young argues that the model of reason and discourse that figures in deliberative democracy is complicit in the denial of difference (Young, 1993b, p. 127,
2000, pp. 6–7, 37–40). Young’s critique, here, is that the norm of rationality embodied in deliberative discussion, even if free, equal and reasonable, presupposes and
therefore perpetuates the conception of reason of one dominant group and, as
such, is ‘used as a means of asserting power’ that ‘silences those who give reasons
or make pleas of the “wrong” form’. In an ‘open discussion’, Young concludes,
‘what counts as “acceptable” speech must itself be understood as contestable’
(Young, 1993b, pp. 127–8) and indeed defends means of political communication
such as greeting, rhetoric and story-telling to supplement more formal modes of
communication (Young, 1995, 2000, chapter 2, passim.).
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Furthermore, deliberative democracy presupposes or seeks discursive unity, conceived either as pre-discursive ‘shared understandings’ or common ends to which
discussion aims (Young, 1993b, p. 128, 2000, pp. 40–4). In doing so it ‘tends to
close off the alterity of others’ (Young, 1993b, p. 128), marginalises their contribution to debate, and ‘obviates the need for self-transcendence’ (Young, 1995,
p. 125), that is, for self-scrutiny on behalf of discursive participants. One may, of
course, reconceptualise unity as the end to which discussion should aim so that
‘participants transcend their subjective, self-regarding perspective on political issues
by putting aside their particular interests and seeking the good of the whole’
(Young, 1995, p. 126). This, however, will only allow ‘the perspectives of the privileged ... to dominate the definition of that common good’ (Young, 1995, p. 126).
Instead of the interest group or deliberative model, Young argues for a conception
of democracy that is sensitive to difference. We are asked to ‘consider just democratic decision-making as a politics of need interpretation’ that would involve the
giving of public resources to enable oppressed social groups to deliberate upon their
collective experience and policy proposals as well as veto powers against policies
that are unpalatable to them (Young, 1990, pp. 184–5, 252, 2000, pp. 228–35).
Furthermore, the process of need interpretation is open, accessible and, crucially,
one which ‘third parties may witness ... within institutions that give these others
the opportunity to ... enter a discussion, and through media that allow anyone in
principle to enter the discussion’ (Young, 1987, p. 73, emphasis added) and takes
as its object the results of socio-economic interaction in all areas of economic and
social life, thus expanding ‘the range of decisions that are made through democratic processes’ (Young, 1990, pp. 91, 251). In effect, Young advocates the replacement of the division of labour with a ‘democratic division of labour’ (Young, 1990,
pp. 222–5) in which the production and distribution of goods as well as the relative status of various social groups are subject to the endorsement of the democratic public. In developing the notion of the democratic division of labour Young
offers three criteria – the ‘modified Millian test’ – by which individual actions are
acceptable and consequently do not have to be brought under the authority of the
democratic public: that actions taken and their consequences (a) do not harm
others, (b) do not inhibit the ability of individuals to develop and exercise their
capacities within the limits of mutual respect and cooperation, and (c) do not determine conditions under which other agents are compelled to act (Young, 1990, pp.
250–1). Young makes two central claims on behalf of the witnessed, democratic
division of labour: an epistemological claim that decisions reached will be more
rational and an ethical claim that they will be more just than ‘hundreds of
autonomous public and private units attempting to maximise their perceived interests’ (Young, 1990, p. 254, emphasis added).6
The Division of Knowledge and the Epistemological
Benefits of Democracy
Surprisingly, perhaps, Young’s epistemological claim shares a strong affinity with
the kind of claim that Hayek is well known for making on behalf of the market.
Yet, this should not be surprising once the affinity between other aspects of
Young’s and Hayek’s work is made clear. Firstly, like Young for whom the identity-
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conferring properties of social groups are to be taken as primitive, Hayek argues
from a conception of the self that is only ever social in the communitarian sense,
although this is a label with which for historical reasons he perhaps would not
have been familiar (Hayek, 1948a, 1948c, 1960, pp. 54–70, 1982a, pp. 8–34). Furthermore, and similarly to Young’s invocation of market relations to emphasise that
in contemporary societies ‘nearly everyone depends on the activities of seen and
unseen strangers who mediate between oneself and one’s associates, between
oneself and one’s objects of desire’ (Young, 1990, p. 237), always central to Hayek’s
research project was the insight that we live ‘in a society which exists only because
we are capable of serving people whom we do not know, and even of whose existence we are ignorant; and we in turn constantly live on the services of other
people of whom we know nothing’ (Hayek, 1983, p. 46). Moreover, Hayek’s
writings on the benefits of the market effecting economic co-ordination under the
‘division of knowledge’ emergent from mediation relate clearly to Young’s claim
that group-differentiated democratic communication promotes the practical
wisdom – or ‘enlarged thought’ – that is conducive to rational decision-making in
the politics of difference (Young, 1997b, 1997c). Finally, and despite writing in an
altogether different context, Hayek too was troubled by what he saw as the factionalism inherent in democratic decision-making, what he called ‘the playball of
group interests’ in which individual self-interest is merely replaced by that of the
group (Hayek, 1982b, pp. 13–17, 89–100).
In contrast to Young, however, Hayek’s research project was always informed by
the epistemological, rather than the ethical demands that mediation, social embeddedness and the division of knowledge place upon the task and nature of justice.
More specifically, the problematic here for at least the earlier Hayek was that due
to mediation, social knowledge of resource and investment needs and opportunities is widely dispersed and, as such, never given in totality to any single agent
(Hayek, 1948b, 1948d). Thus, in the case of public institutions whose task is to
make decisions for society as a whole, it is unclear how the collection of the necessary information for rational decision-making would be possible given that the
knowledge at their disposal is necessarily limited to those who occupy positions of
authority within them. Given this, for Hayek decisions regarding investment or
resource allocation, for instance, would, in order to be rational, have to occur under
the auspices of institutions that facilitate rather than assume the collection of
diffuse knowledge (Hayek, 1948b, p. 50). That is, rather than assume that the requisite knowledge of needs and opportunities was already given and that actually
making a public investment or allocation decision was epistemologically unproblematic (Hayek, 1948e, pp. 92–96), public institutions need to facilitate the gathering of such information so that irrational resource or investment aggregate
outcomes could be avoided. Such claims, of course, motivated Hayek’s objections
to socialist economic planning (Hayek, 1935).
Yet, how, if at all, does any of this impact upon the work of a contemporary ‘postsocialist’ theorist such as Young? Significantly, and despite the clear agreement
between them that exists with respect to the factionalism of interest group or
‘aggregative’ democracy, Hayek’s treatment of these issues provides us with good
reason to reject Young’s claim concerning the epistemological benefits of difference
democracy. The reason for this is that, in two important respects, at the heart of
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Young’s conception lies the assumption that the information necessary for rational
public decision-making can be collected within the auspices of the democratic
forum. In the first instance, she assumes that the representatives of marginalised
groups, included precisely to augment the epistemological muscularity of the groupdifferentiated forum, are themselves the happy repositories of group-differentiated
knowledge that would otherwise be lost to the polity. Secondly, she assumes that
the forum as a whole is the repository of the knowledge that is present in the wider
society for whom it is authorised to make decisions. Yet, if one accepts Hayek’s postulate concerning the division of knowledge implied by the very mediation that is
so central to Young’s project, it is difficult to explain how any of the representatives would be capable of interpreting and communicating the interests and needs
of but a small fraction of those they represent, even if we assume, somewhat
naively perhaps, that they actually believed that they ought to do so. Indeed, under
such conditions it is just as likely that representatives would, indeed could, only be
interested in communicating their own interests and needs. This becomes doubly
significant when the members of marginalised groups do not necessarily live side
by side but are scattered across a wide area that makes direct, face-to-face communication of needs and perspectives to representatives impossible. The same consideration applies to the knowledge base of the forum as a whole. How would the
forum be able to expand knowledge beyond that of the representatives that inhabit
it regardless of whether they come from marginalised or dominant sectors of the
population? It is not at all clear, then, how the forum would make use of socially
dispersed knowledge to enlarge thought and secure rational public decisionmaking. It is here, then, where Hayek’s prima facie obsolete claim that the central
planners assume away what needs to be discovered haunts the post-socialist
Young.
The Rule of Reasons and ‘Social’ Decision-Making
A more profound problem that was central to Hayek’s later concerns, and which
takes his arguments beyond the objections raised above, is that not only is social
knowledge widely dispersed, it is often only tacitly held in the traditional and, we
may add, culturally differentiated practices of the diverse members of society and, as
such, not collectable at all (Hayek, 1960, pp. 54–70, 1982a, 1983). This, clearly,
further complicates the process of effecting rational public decisions because the
communication the forum sanctions prioritises explicit reason-giving as a justifiable basis for action when it is by no means always clear why the decisions we
make are in fact the right ones. If decisions are solely based on reason-giving – or,
for that matter, upon other explicit communicative devices such as greeting,
rhetoric and story-telling – this will be at the expense of those inexpressible and
culturally specific motivations for arriving at and carrying out particular decisions
that nonetheless turn out to be socially efficacious. As Hayek tellingly comments
in The Constitution of Liberty, whilst it is probably true that ‘democracy is government by discussion’, this represents but ‘the last stage of the process by which alternative views and desires are tested’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 110). Of course, one could
respond that the representatives bear their own tacit knowledges and these will
serve as latent contributions to public discourse. Yet, as we have already seen, there
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is reason to doubt these will be anything but idiosyncratic, despite any pretensions
their bearers may have for such knowledges being communally and epistemologically authoritative.
To avoid this problem Hayek claims that we need to reorient the locus of authoritative decision-making away from the state – or, in terms of our present discussion, the democratic forum – to individuals. ‘Though discussion is essential,’ he
argues, ‘it is not the most important way by which people ... actually decide what
is best.’ People’s views and desires, he continues, ‘are formed by individuals acting
according to their own designs; and they profit from what others have learned in
their individual experience’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 110). Given the epistemological problematic of mediation, the benefit gained from such a reorientation is for Hayek
akin to an ‘extrasomatic sense’ that allows us ‘to adapt ourselves to events which
happen far beyond our vision’ (Hayek, 1983, pp. 45–6) and, we may add, the carry
of our voices or the lights of our reason. Precisely because the devolution of authoritative decision-making to individuals allows them to act upon their own tacit
and culturally differentiated understandings as well as to learn from that of others,
otherwise inexpressible and culturally diverse knowledge latent in society is discovered and made use of without ever being collected by the forum. Moreover, it
allows not only for a wider process of discovery of answers to questions of public
concern but also for the emergence of new knowledge within that process as each
individual contributes to and takes advantage of the knowledge and perspectives
of others. Thus, for Hayek, individual decision-making does not occur outside
of, nor indeed does it need to be corrected by, a more authoritative and publicspirited democratic process. Rather, it is constitutive of social decision-making in a
far more epistemologically robust manner than the democratic forum is. Paradoxically, then, and because of their unique ability to utilise the diffuse and tacit
knowledge of a mutually ignorant citizenry, for Hayek it is liberal individualist institutions that are truly social whilst those of the democratic forum are fundamentally detached from the vast majority of those whose lives they are supposed to
govern.
This individualist option, however, is ruled out by Young because of the epistemological authority she confers upon the forum. The consequence of this is that
difference democratic discourse not only implies a false assumption concerning the
collection of knowledge; it actually forecloses the social discovery of much of that
which cannot be collected because of the priority attached to the rule of reasons.
Indeed, things are made more complicated by the fact that, as we have already
seen, Young does not merely defend the supplementation of individual decisionmaking with a democratic discourse, but rather the replacement of the division of
labour (and knowledge) with a system in which almost all of society’s decisions
are made via the rule of reasons. Given this, and far beyond the problem of discovery, it is hard to see from whence the differentiated knowledge and perspectives we are invited to bring to the difference democratic forum are actually
supposed to arise, regardless of whether they are marginalised or not. To the detriment, then, of the very creation of culturally differentiated tacit knowledge, let
alone its discovery, for Young democratic communication is not even the last stage
of the public decision-making process. It is the only stage.
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Of course, this may be an unfair charge given Young’s keenness to make decisionmaking a local affair (Young, 1990, pp. 248–56, 2000, pp. 228–35). Indeed, as a
logical extension of her concern in Justice and the Politics of Difference with mediation and continuing her critique of deliberative democracy, Young claims in
Inclusion and Democracy that numerous theorists ‘assume that deliberations
occur in a single forum where deliberators face each other directly’ (Young, 2000,
pp. 44–5). In Habermasian vein, Young claims that this ‘centred’ model of democratic communication wrongly assumes that it is possible to bring ‘large and
complex social processes’ into the view of the deliberators so that just decisions
may be made and enforced (Young, 2000, pp. 45–6). Moreover, pace the unified
conception of deliberative democracy, it is often impossible for those affected to
be present when decisions are made (Young, 2000, pp. 45–6). Yet, whilst going
some way to answering our Hayekian concerns, the defence of local decisionmaking ultimately begs the question at a different level. How, after all, are local
democratic fora to take into consideration knowledge that is not given – because
it is not possessed by the representatives, is possessed by those outside of
the jurisdiction for which the representatives legislate yet who nonetheless will
be affected by decisions made, or is only tacitly held – but which is necessary
for an adequate assessment of consequences? This problem is made clear when
one considers the ‘modified Millian test’ against which actions are to be judged
(Young, 1990, pp. 250–1). Following Carol Gould, we may claim that there
would be no way of knowing if an action was to harm, hinder or determine the
conditions under which others are compelled to act because we would have
no means of making the necessary information for such a judgement socially
available (Gould, 1996, pp. 176–7). How, moreover, would local fora avoid stifling
the creation of new knowledge, given the vast scope of the authority they
wield?
Rather than offering an account of justice that enables the polity to discover what
course of action is most rational on the basis of the conveyance, discovery and
creation of knowledge, Young not only assumes that such knowledge is already
given to the tiny minority who find themselves directly involved in the process of
democratic communication. Indeed, she actually forecloses its discovery and even
its creation because of an implicit bias towards explicit reason-giving as a justifiable basis for public decision-making in almost all areas of social and economic life.
The difference emergent from mediation, then, turns out to be a thoroughly unexploited resource in difference democratic communication.
Membership, Perspective and the Ethical Benefits
of Democracy
The epistemological arguments above can be invoked anew to critique Young’s
ethical claim concerning the justice of group-differentiated democratic decisionmaking. As we have seen, one problem for a specifically difference democratic form
of decision-making concerns its viability under conditions of mediation where
direct participation by all members of the polity is a physical impossibility. This is
a problem of which Young is acutely aware and it leads her to defend a certain
form of representation. If due to mediation, she writes:
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we accept the argument that representation is necessary, but we also
accept an image of democratic decision-making as requiring a copresence of citizens, and that representation is legitimate only if in some
way the representative is identical with the constituency, then, we have
a paradox: representation is necessary but impossible (Young, 2000,
p. 126).
Young hopes to resolve this by appealing to Derrida’s concept of différance to replace
the logic of identity implicit in the deliberative democratic ideal by one that leaves
the many who are to be represented ‘in their plurality without requiring their collection into a common identity’ (Young, 2000, p. 127). The consequence of this,
moreover, will be to avoid the charge that the only form of authentic democracy
is one that ‘imagines an ideal democratic decision-making situation ... in which the
citizens are co-present’ (Young, 2000, p. 126). Thus, in the light of the appeal to différance that acknowledges and affirms the ‘separation between the representative
and the constituents’, Young distinguishes between the representative function
being one of speaking as the oppressed and of speaking for them (Young, 2000, pp.
127–8). To speak as the oppressed clearly would presuppose co-presence or at least
the convergence of interests and opinions. ‘Conceiving representation as a differentiated relationship among plural actors’, however, ‘dissolves the paradox of how
one person can stand for the experience of many’, and reconciles democracy with
the requirements of social group difference (Young, 2000, pp. 127, 133).
Yet, notwithstanding its adequacy at coping with mediation, it is unclear whether
the solution to the problem of the one and the many squares with the antiessentialist conception of social groups and the ethical claim to justice. In fact, they
are in serious tension and the defence of representation as speaking for is but a distraction from the central problem. If the ontological claim that social groups are
fluid, cross cutting and not possessed of determinate boundaries is to be taken seriously, then the avocation of any representative form of decision-making will
inevitably culminate in the essentialisation of social groups at the level of institutions, regardless of whether they are represented in the as or for mode. This is
because there will need to occur at the level of institutions a definitive ‘closing off’
of hitherto undecidable social group boundaries to enable the representative to represent something in the forum. Yet, both Anne Philips and Alison Jaggar have
pointed out that closing off group borders runs counter to the anti-essentialist
thrust of the conception of social groups (Philips, 1995, pp. 9–10, 52–4, 155–60,
1996, pp. 144–6; Jaggar, 1999, p. 314).
Similarly to Hayek’s solution to the epistemological problematic posed by mediation, one way to resolve this would be to argue for individualised representation,
or what we may for present purposes call ‘self-representation’, in which the ultimately individual particularity implied by an anti-essentialist account of social
groups is given full expression. Now, Young is indeed correct to claim that selfrepresentation within a democratic institutional framework – that is, democratic
communication in an individualised ‘as’ mode – would place far too great a burden
upon the rationality of public decision-making. Yet, she is surely too hasty in claiming that a defence of the aggregation of ‘individual votes to obtain one representative’ to overcome the problem of the one and the many ‘is the only way to
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implement such political individualism’ (Young, 2000, p. 142, emphasis added).
An alternative, for instance, would be for liberal individualist self-representation
where participants in social discourse quite literally speak for themselves outside
of democratic public fora (their private fora may, of course, be democratic). Here
not only do individuals speak for themselves, but speech is defined metaphorically
to allow the fact that, more often than not, actions motivated by tacit understandings speak just as loudly as words, as individuals act upon the basis of their
own cultural membership and often tacit knowledge of the preferences, interests
and opinions such membership and knowledge shapes. Endogenously emergent
from this process, moreover, would be an aggregate idea of just which people
belong to which groups. That is, under this Hayekian conception answers to questions concerning cultural membership, like questions concerning resource allocation, are given not by an epistemologically truncated process of public political
annunciation but, rather, are discovered from within liberal individualist institutions.
However, because Young remains wedded to democracy she implicitly rejects the
notion that individual self-representation could meaningfully occur outside of a
specifically democratic public decision-making procedure.
It seems, then, that if we are to emphasise the undecidability of social group boundaries then the coherent form of representation is self-representation. Without it,
Young’s claim concerning the ethical benefits of communicative democratic political formations is compromised. The need to define groups not only flouts the antiessentialist conception of social groups but merely raises within them the problems
of differential positioning and power that would lie behind any authoritative public
definition of the group. If, in the absence of an account of how marginalised voices
within groups are to be rehabilitated, one retains the commitment to representative
public decision-making, it is not at all clear how, in Young’s own terms, all the
voices within dominated and oppressed groups – save those of the elect (or elected)
few – will be heard at all regardless of whether they are represented in an as or for
mode. Moreover, the problem of the public political definition of membership is a
negative one insofar as any definition given may have the sorry consequence of
imposing as well as withdrawing membership upon unwilling segments of the population.7 It is not how groups are represented but, rather, that they are represented
that is the source of the tension between Young’s account of groups and the particular set of democratic institutions she claims it and the account of mediation
demand.
Notwithstanding the problem of offering a non-exclusive or onerously inclusive
definition of the group, whether Young’s avocation of speaking for is an adequate
solution to the problem of the one and the many also would depend upon explaining what it entails. Here a distinction is drawn between ‘interests’, ‘ideas’ or ‘opinions’ that directly reveal what it is that an individual or group wants or believes
to be right and ‘perspectives’ that typically represent their points of view more generally construed (Young, 2000, pp. 133–41). Despite appearing as a somewhat
vague notion, the idea of perspective should not be dismissed because it does arise
quite naturally and consistently from the anti-essentialist conception of social
groups. Vagueness, then, is here a virtue, for just as a social group is not specifiable in terms of a determinate essence, ‘a social perspective’, Young writes, ‘does
not contain a determinate specific content’ (Young, 2000, p. 137). Moreover, the
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example of the black American newspaper the Pittsburgh Courier in whose opinion
pages ‘appear editorials that cover the range from right-wing libertarianism to leftwing socialism, from economic separatism to liberal integrationism’ (Young, 2000,
p. 138) shows how this may be so. In contrast to the particular ideas, opinions and
interests that the Pittsburgh Courier prints, the idea of perspective is specifically
offered ‘to capture that sensibility of group-positioned experience without specifying unified content to what the perspective sees’ (Young, 2000, pp. 138–9). This
role, of course, is fulfilled by the very existence of the Pittsburgh Courier itself for,
despite being host to a wide range of opinions, the newspaper is specifically concerned with events that ‘involve African Americans as the major actors, and take
place at sites and within institutions which are majority African American or
otherwise specifically associated with African Americans’ (Young, 2000, p. 138).
‘When the paper discusses local or national events not specifically identified
with African Americans,’ she continues, ‘the stories usually ask questions or give
emphases that are particularly informed by issues and experiences more specific
to African Americans’ (Young, 2000, p. 138). Thus, Young rejects the claim that
group representation ‘obscures differences within the group, wrongly reduces all
members of the group to a common essence, and thereby divides groups so much
from each other that understanding across the differences may become impossible’ (Young, 2000, p. 143). Rather, it is hoped that it will combat the ‘individualist’ idea ‘that any talk of structured social positions and group-defined social location is wrong, incoherent, or useless’ (Young, 2000, p. 138), for to talk of the
vulnerabilities of certain marginalised groups as systematic and predictable does
indeed capture a common-sense intuition. However, it is doubtful whether the
notion of perspective gets us very far at all if Young’s emphasis upon differentiated
perspectives and the difficulty of coming to a full understanding of another’s
perspective is applied, as the anti-essentialist account demands, to the internal
configuration of the perspective of the social group itself. How would it be possible
for representatives of groups adequately to represent without a general group
perspective?
Moreover, it seems in any case that the example of the Pittsburgh Courier does not
achieve the desired result. The problem here is that such newspapers publish a
wide variety of opinions from within the social group because they are not concerned with enforcing public policy decisions but, rather, with discussing them.
Politics, however, is not journalism and cannot afford the luxury of talking in perpetuity about current affairs. Rather, it is charged with enforcing decisions to the
exclusion of those that are deemed to have lost out in public political debate. Yet,
before this, in a specifically group-differentiated politics, representatives would
have to decide which of the many policy alternatives covered by publications such
as the Pittsburgh Courier is to be presented to the public forum as definitive of their
perspective. This, of course, is no easy task. Again, similarly to the political definition of the group, this problem becomes not only one of the unavoidable silencing or exclusion of some members but also that these same group-level losers also
end up having policy options with which they have neither intellectual nor moral
empathy foisted upon them by their representatives. Without an account explaining why representatives of social groups are able to represent non-exclusively and
not over-inclusively – that is, why they are the inhabitants of some kind of privi-
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leged perspectival position within the group – Young has not made good on her
ethical claim.
Of course, in anticipation of the charge that offering an account of representationof does not resolve the problem of group-level difference, Young puts forward the
idea of plural representation as a vehicle for the reflection of the plurality and differentiatedness to be found within a social group’s perspective (Young, 2000, p.
148). Again, however, this only puts off the question to a later stage. Who, after
all, is to decide how the committees are to be composed? The emphasis upon speaking for and the pluralising of group representation, then, is a distraction from the
problem the anti-essentialist account presents to the ethical commitment to a
democratic decision-making procedure. With the notions of representation and
perspective arise the questions of who is to decide who is to count as a member
of a group, of who is to decide upon the perspectival content that is to be communicated on its behalf and of how in both instances such decisions would not
immediately beg the question of the differential positioning of and power relations
between the members of the group. Of course, and despite writing some forty years
before Young, Hayek neatly expressed similar concerns when he complained that
‘the current theory of democracy suffers from the fact that it is usually developed
with some ideal homogenous community in view and then applied to the very
imperfect and arbitrary units which the existing states constitute’ (Hayek, 1960, p.
105). Regardless of whether the form of democratic decision-making is aggregative, deliberative or communicative, the absence of a principled account that deals
adequately with the issue of group-specific power relations and processes of marginalisation, and how these shape the public articulation of group membership and
perspective that democratic representation demands, makes Hayek’s concern all
the more pressing. Rather than asserting that there is a given group and a given perspective capable of representation in the wider public – that is, rather than falling
afoul of what we may call a neo-Hayekian or cultural synoptic delusion (Hayek,
1982a, pp. 14–15) – the anti-essentialist account of social groups reorients an
account of justice towards principles that facilitate the discovery and creation rather
than the annunciation of membership and perspective. Such principles are liberal
principles that respond to the epistemological problematic that socially embedded
and mutually ignorant individuals present to public decision-making (Hayek, 1960,
p. 26, 1982a, pp. 13–14).
Inclusion, Democracy and the Rediscovery of
Civil Society
Yet, perhaps we are being too hasty in our criticisms of the instrumental and ethical
claims of difference democracy for it seems to imply that the post-socialist Young
has drawn no lessons from recent geopolitical history. Inclusion and Democracy represents at least three new developments that advances, Young’s research programme. Two of these – the ‘cosmopolitanist turn’ and the reformulation of the
conception of social groups (Young, 2000, pp. 81–120, 236–75) – are significant in
many respects but are not of primary importance here.8 Rather, what is important
for present purposes is a third development that Young describes as the ‘rediscovery’ of civil society (Young, 2000, pp. 154–95). The rediscovery of civil society con-
DOES INCLUSION REQUIRE DEMOCRACY?
209
cerns the scope of democratic decision-making that she claims is vital for public
decisions in contemporary mass societies to respect and reflect the differing perspectives of their highly differentiated populations. For it seems clear that, rather
than defending a ‘thick’ model of democratic decision-making in which all decisions taken in civil society are politicised, in Inclusion and Democracy Young is willing
to give more scope to it precisely because it is reflective of the diverse modes
of association and decision-making of many contemporary (Western) societies.
Indeed, she claims in the introduction to the newer book that the second of the
two principal questions she sets out to answer – an answer given in chapters four
and five – is that of ‘how to understand communicative democracy in the context
of mass societies’ (Young, 1999, 2000, p. 8). ‘Democratic politics’, she contends,
‘must respond to this scale, and thus must involve millions of people related to one
another through democratic institutions’, as well as ‘explain how its norms and
values can apply to mass polities where the relations among members are complexly mediated rather than direct and face to face’ (Young, 2000, p. 45). Thus,
out of this more recent concern comes what appears to be her scaling back of
the scope of difference democracy and the fora it demands to capture precisely
the informal civic social aspect of society (Young, 2000, pp. 188–95, 238, 245–6).
Thus, Young offers a decentred rather than a ‘centred’ model of democratic
decision-making.9
What Young says here is of great significance, for she sees that putting forward the
idea of civil society as a means of combating domination also raises the question of
what is to count as the public sphere. On the one hand deliberative democrats – and
in this connection Young specifically mentions Gutmann and Thompson (Gutmann
and Thompson, 1996) – generally conceive of the discourse as occurring within the
auspices of state institutions, whilst theorists such as Fraser widen the locus of political discourse to include the more informal institutions of civil society precisely
because the public sphere, when considered as a single entity, is all too often dominated by powerful groups, with the result that public debate is reinterpreted as
‘mediated among people dispersed in place and time’ (Young, 2000, pp. 167–73;
Fraser, 1993). The benefits of this conception of the public (like Hayek’s conception
of the market, in fact) is that it allows for a diversity of modes of expression (Young,
2000, pp. 167–68). As Young claims in Inclusion and Democracy, the associative activity to be found in the informal institutions of civil society ‘fosters democratic inclusion by enabling excluded or marginalised groups to find each other, develop
counter-publics, and express their opinions and perspectives to a wider public’ and
enables ‘individuals collectively to authorise modes and sites in which aspects of
their lives are represented in political discussion’. As such, she concludes, ‘[c]ivil
society limits the ability of both state and economy to colonise the lifeworld, and
fosters individual and collective self-determination’ (Young, 2000, pp. 188–9). Most
interestingly, Young discusses as among the virtues of civil society the idea of ‘intrasociety change outside state institutions’(Young, 2000, p. 179) in which reform is
effected from within the auspices of civil society as opposed to from without, that is
under the auspices of the state or single, unifying deliberative forum. Citing change
effected by discussion of gender and environmental issues, Young claims that
‘[p]ublic organising and engagement ... can be thought of as processes by which
society communicates to itself about its needs, problems, and creative ideas for how
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to solve them’ (Young, 2000, p. 179). Furthermore, only in this way can the idea of
the public sphere be helpful ‘in describing how a diverse, complex, mass society,
then can address social problems through public action’ (Young, 2000, p. 171).
Young’s flirtation with civil society, then would seem to be set to be serious and prolonged and rebuts our Hayekian critique of difference democracy.
Yet, despite all of this, Young contends that precisely due to their necessarily plural
and diffuse nature the institutions of civil society are unable to grapple with oppression where ‘systematic institutional processes prevent some people from learning
and using satisfying or expansive skills in socially recognised settings, or which
inhibit people’s ability to play and communicate with others or express their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen’ (Young,
2000, p. 156) no matter how well they alleviate domination. Thus, whilst being able
to deal with domination because the plurality inherent in civil society means that
we are able to participate directly on our own terms in decision-making, this same
plurality is unable to tackle the problem of oppression (Young, 2000, p. 186).
‘Indeed,’ she claims, ‘the activities of civil society may exacerbate problems of
inequality, marginalisation, and inhibition of the development of capabilities’
(Young, 2000, p. 186, emphasis added). This is because the mechanics of oppression take place within the economy. ‘Because many of the structural injustices that
produce oppression have their source in economic processes,’ she writes, ‘state
institutions are necessary to undermine such oppression and promote selfdevelopment’ (Young, 2000, pp. 156, 180, 185). Only the state, then, has the power
to rectify oppression because it facilitates ‘the co-ordination required for a society
to ensure investment in needs, skills development, infrastructure, and quality environment for everyone, and to organise any useful occupations so that those not
self-employed or working for private enterprise have options for meaningful work’
(Young, 2000, pp. 186, 180–1).
Given that the alleviation of domination will be the preserve of civil society, what
are we to make of this epistemological, co-coordinative claim on behalf of the state?
It is precisely here where Hayek’s epistemological arguments are most telling, for
they would seem to be in direct opposition to Young’s claim. Of course, Young does
acknowledge at least one classical liberal or what she calls ‘libertarian’ objection to
state management: ‘that the use of the state to promote particular social outcomes
wrongly interferes with the liberty of individuals, organisations and firms’ (Young,
2000, p. 187). Yet, she does not acknowledge what we may characterise as the
Hayekian variant of this objection. This is all the more curious because it trades in
part precisely on the problems that flow from the nature of knowledge in societies
marked by mediated social relations. The problem, then, is not the ‘libertarian’
objection to interference with liberty per se – always controversial in societies where
unanimity concerning the good is hard to come by – but, rather, with the epistemological assumption of given knowledge implicit in the idea that a particular
social outcome is a logically possible objective for the state to achieve. The problem
here is that the state, composed of elected and unelected individuals on the ground,
can only take into account and make decisions about those aspects of social relations that are of a explicit local and face-to-face nature. From the Hayekian perspective, what is astounding about Young’s claim that the state is able to promote
co-ordination in a way that the more decentred institutions of civil society (includ-
DOES INCLUSION REQUIRE DEMOCRACY?
211
ing but not exhausted by those of the market) cannot is that it is precisely the
falsity of this claim which was always central to Hayek’s rejection of such a role,
regardless of the precise goal that the state seeks to achieve. It is the very complexity of society that makes competition ‘the only method by which such co-ordination can be adequately brought about’ (Hayek, 1944, p. 48). ‘There would be
no difficulty about efficient control or planning,’ he reminds us, ‘were conditions
so simple that a single person or board could effectively survey all the relevant
facts’ (Hayek, 1944, p. 48). Regardless of the aim to be achieved, it seems inappropriate to advocate a co-ordinating mechanism based on the face-to-face model
of social interaction and the assumption of given knowledge that is its corollary
when the objects of that co-ordination are mediated socio-economic relations. Similarly, it is difficult to see how the invocation of the state would not immediately
raise the ethical question of who is to occupy its positions of authority, regardless
of whether special efforts are made to include representatives of otherwise marginal groups. Ultimately, what Young gives to politics via group-differentiated
democratic communication and a ‘rediscovery’ of civil society as a means of recovering perspectives that would otherwise be ignored is taken away by the defence
of the emancipatory role of the state. The politics of difference appears too readily
to become a politics of exclusion because the state would have to decide which
resources are to be allocated and to whom and this would mean the selection of
resource winners and losers, along lines which one would expect Young to be
anxious about.
Conclusion
Despite refinements in Inclusion and Democracy, Young fails to elaborate a politics
that is sensitive to difference for the account of groups, and the notion of mediation militate against the ethical and instrumental benefits of a democratic discourse
supplemented by a co-ordinating role for the state. This, moreover, brings us back
to the connection with recent events, for we should not be too surprised that in
Hayek’s epistemological explanations for the failure of central planning there can
be found arguments – with suitable modifications – against the kind of politics that
Young proposes. After all, if Barry’s thesis is correct, then the politics of difference
– and perhaps other democratic accounts of difference politics that space has not
permitted us to consider – may reasonably be expected to have inherited some of
the defects of its historical precursor.
What could be done to resolve these problems? It seems that the Hayekian perspective to which we have appealed in our critique can also shoulder in an entirely
new way the burdens that an assumption of ontological anti-essentialism and
socio-economic mediation place upon the character of public institutions. This, of
course, is no argument for brute self-interest but, rather, a more general claim
derived from an epistemological argument that ‘merely starts from the indisputable
fact that the limits of our powers of imagination make it impossible to include in
our scale of values more than a sector of the needs of the whole society’ (Hayek,
1944, p. 59). Thus, in a manner identical to Young’s invocation of civil society as
the locus of the emergence of strategies for the overcoming of domination, it is to
liberal individualist principles of justice that we must look to alleviate the effects
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of oppression as readily as possible and, importantly in a world of diverse beliefs,
to ascertain what priority such a project should take relative to other possible projects. At
the level of institutions this would mean, pace Young – indeed, pace Barry who
defends liberal egalitarian economic rights as supplementary to formal property
rights in the place of a group-differentiated multicultural politics (Barry, 2001) –
the devolution of the role of the alleviation of oppression as well as of domination
to civil society which comprehends but is not exhausted by market institutions. If
it is to achieve anything today, then, Hayek’s political theory should remind us that
an account of justice under conditions of diversity should not require a commitment to democracy, regardless of whether it comes before or after a rediscovery of
civil society. Rather, it requires a defence of liberal individualist principles of justice,
a more expansive account of which must be left for another occasion.
(Accepted: 22 May 2002)
About the Author
Adam Tebble, Department of Government, London School of Economics, Houghton Street,
London WC2A 2AE, UK; email: a.j.tebble@lse.ac.uk
Notes
I would like to thank Dr Paul Kelly at the LSE and the anonymous referees at Political Studies for their
comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 Whether the politics of difference or other broadly multicultural theories should be rejected is a question addressed in more depth in Tebble (2002).
2 Indeed, there is evidence in both Justice and the Politics of Difference and Inclusion and Democracy that
Young adopts a methodologically individualistic position here. On this, see Young (1990, p. 44, 2000,
p. 89).
3 See also Young (1990, p. 42, 2000, p. 99). Furthermore, an individual’s particular social group conferred identities may appear, disappear and reappear through time. On this, see Young (1989, p. 260).
4 On one occasion at least Young seeks to establish a necessary relationship between democracy and
difference (Young, 1997b, p. 59).
5 On impartiality, see Young (1987, 1990). On the ideal of community, see Young (1986, 1990). On
Young’s ambition to forge a position distinct from both liberalism and communitarianism, see Tebble
(2002).
6 See also Young (1990, pp. 93, 186, 1989, p. 264, 1997b, pp. 58–9, 2000, pp. 7, 30–1, 81–120).
7 This is a problem that informs Barry’s discussion of minority language education in Quebec. On this,
see Barry (2001, pp. 67–8).
8 Both of these have been discussed at length in Tebble (2002).
9 Young does point out that claiming that democracy is decentred does not mean that it is decentralised.
On this, see Young (2000, pp. 46–7).
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