Survey
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project
Chairholders: Christian Gourieroux (CREST and University of Toronto) Christophe Pérignon (HEC Paris) A Network of Researchers on Regulation and Systemic Risks A Network in the Credit Default Swap Market: Chair Network: 2 Research Themes (non-exhaustive list) (1) Definition and measure of systemic risk (SIFIs) (2) Regulatory capital (3) Sources of financial instability (4) Reserves for solvency and liquidity risks (5) Real effects of banking and financial regulation (6) Clearing houses (7) Estimation risk (8) Collateral (9) Contagion (10) Interconnection of financial institutions (11) Validation of risk models (12) Mortality and longevity risk 3 List of Researchers AURAY Stéphane (CREST and ENSAI) CHALLE Edouard (CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique et CREST) DE BANDT Olivier (ACPR) FERMANIAN Jean-David (CREST) FRAISSE Henri (ACPR) GOURIEROUX Christian (CREST and University of Toronto) (chair) HEAM Jean-Cyprien (ACPR and CREST) HURLIN Christophe (University of Orleans) LOISEL Olivier (CREST and ENSAE) MONFORT Alain (University of Maastricht and CREST) PERIGNON Christophe (HEC Paris) (co-chair) RENNE Jean-Paul (Banque de France) THESMAR David (HEC Paris) ZAKOIAN Jean-Michel (CREST) Associated Researchers BILLIO Monica (University of Venice) DUBECQ Simon (European Central Bank) GAGLIARDINI Patrick (University of Lugano) JASIAK Joan (York University, Canada) SCAILLET Olivier (University of Geneva) 4 Research Activities • Monthly Seminar on Regulation and Systemic Risks “Basels Accords versus Solvency II: Regulatory Adequacy and Consistency under the Postcrisis Standards”, Caroline Siegel (Université de St Gallen), May 6, 2014 • Conferences “Systemic Risk and Financial Regulation” Conference, July 3-4, 2014, Banque de France. Guest speakers: Darrel Duffie (Stanford) and Robert Engle (NYU) • Books [2 in 2013] • Working papers [30 in 2013] and published articles [34 in 2013] • Presentations at seminars and meetings [>50 in 2013] 5 [1] How to Make Clearing Houses More Resilient ”Derivatives Clearing, Default Risk, and Insurance” Jones and Pérignon (2013) i j Equity L L Interest rate S S Commodity L L margin ”CoMargin”, Cruz, Harris, Hurlin, and Pérignon (2014) CoMargin [2] Quantifying the Collateral Risk of ETFs “The Collateral Risk of ETFs”, Hurlin, Iseli, Pérignon and Yeung (2014) • In a physical ETF, investors' money is directly invested in the index constituents. • In a synthetic ETF, the fund issuer enters into a total return swap with a financial institution which promises to pay the performance of the underlying index. 69% of the ETFs and 35% of AUM in Europe, 100% of leveraged and inverse ETFs in the world Swap, hence counterparty risk collateral • Since 2011, allegations made by the Financial Stability Board and IMF about the overall poor quality of ETF collateral. Massive outflows from synthetic ETFs in 2011-Q3. 89% of investors in the UK state a specific preference for physical ETFs over synthetic ETFs (Morningstar, April 2012). UCITS rules: 20% max per issuer in collateral portfolio; swap reset 7 Synthetic ETF Structure 8 Synthetics: From Allegations to Outflows 120 Factiva (left axis) 300 100 Google (rigth axis) 250 80 200 60 150 40 100 20 50 0 Google Searches for "Synthetic ETF" Number of Press Articles on "Synthetic ETF" 350 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* Annual Change in AUM in Europe ($ bio) 60 Physical ETFs 50 Synthetic ETFs 40 30 20 10 0 2006 2007 2008 -10 -20 -30 9 Low-Quality Collateral? Let’s Have a Look • Study the composition of the $40.9bn collateral portfolio of 164 ETFs managed by the second largest ETF provider in Europe, db x-Trackers. • For each fund, we know the exact composition of the collateral portfolio every week between July 2012 and November 2012. • What we do: (1) Measure the level of collateralization (NAV vs. collateral) (2) Assess the quality of the collateral (diversification, asset types, liquidity, ratings, correlation with index tracked and swap counterparty) (3) Estimate the likelihood and the magnitude of a collateral shortfall in a given fund. (4) Show how to build an optimal collateral portfolio for an ETF. 10 A Preview of the Results Number of ETFs AUM ($ Mio) Total Asset Exposure Equities Government Bonds Money Markets Commodities Hedge Funds Strategies Credits Corporate Bonds Currencies Multi Assets Geographic Exposure Europe World Asia-Pacific North America Rest of the World Total 164 Funded 112 Unfunded 52 37,927 20,122 17,805 74.5% (111) 11.0% (24) 6.6% (4) 3.8% (2) 2.2% (6) 0.7% (9) 0.6% (3) 0.3% (4) 0.3% (1) 85.5% (100) 2.2% (2) 7.2% (2) 3.9% (3) 0.6% (4) 0.6% (1) 61.9% (11) 20.8% (22) 14.0% (4) 0.3% (3) 1.6% (9) 1.4% (3) - 58.9% (79) 22.3% (41) 9.4% (28) 7.2% (14) 2.2% (2) 29.4% (41) 37.0% (38) 17.6% (24) 11.9% (7) 4.1% (2) 92.4% (38) 5.5% (3) 0.2% (4) 1.9% (7) 11 Size of Collateral Portfolios Collateral Value ($ Mio) All Number of Collateral Securities All Average Number of Collateral Securities per Fund All Equities Government Bonds Money Markets Commodities Hedge Funds Strategies Credits Corporate Bonds Currencies Multi Assets Collateralization All Equities Government Bonds Total Funded Unfunded 40,940 23,080 17,860 3,299 3,014 1,141 81 109 14 20 93 37 10 12 50 70 110 117 13 93 66 50 70 18 35 16 20 9 10 12 - 108.4% 109.6% 102.8% 114.6% 115.7% 100.7% 101.3% 99.9% 103.1% 12 Types of Collateral Securities Number of Collateral Securities Asset Exposure Geographic Exposure Panel A: Type of Collateral Securities All types Equity Gov. Bonds Corp. Bonds 3,299 2,591 490 218 All Equity Gov. Bonds Corp. Bonds Others 74.9% 92.5% 40.8% 19.7% 2.7% 96.5% 100.0% 48.8% 5.4% 4.8% 3.5% 10.4% Panel B: Geographic Origin of the Collateral Securities Europe Asia-Pacific N. America R. World All 66.0% 17.5% 16.3% 0.2% Europe 71.8% 13.9% 13.9% 0.4% Asia-Pacific 56.0% 24.1% 19.8% 0.1% N. America 58.3% 22.1% 19.5% 0.1% Rest of the World 58.1% 25.5% 16.3% 0.1% World 58.8% 21.7% 19.4% 0.1% “home bias“ 13 Bonds Used as Collateral Bond issuer North America Asia-Pacific 6.5% 11.2% 8.9% 21.3% 4.8% 3.5% All Gov. Bonds Corporate Bonds Europe 82.2% 69.8% 91.6% Bond Type All Gov. Bonds Corporate Bonds AAA 46.1% 62.9% 34.8% AA 22.1% 22.0% 21.9% A 15.3% 14.4% 16.2% BBB 4.6% 0.6% 7.3% BB 2.9% 0.1% 4.9% B 0.3% 0.5% n/a 8.7% 14.4% Bond Issuer Europe North America Asia Pacific 50.5% 60.3% 12.6% 17.3% 0.2% 65.4% 17.9% 0.2% 5.3% 5.4% 1.6% 0.3% 1.8% 13.5% 3.8% 0.1% 3.3% - 7.0% 20.9% 12.6% Bond Type Rest of the World 0.1% 0.1% Rating 14 Turnover Turnover All Equities Government Bonds Money Markets Commodities Hedge Funds Strategies Credits Corporate Bonds Currencies Multi Assets Total 34.0% 43.9% 1.3% 2.2% 72.7% 29.7% 1.4% 2.4% 60.8% 76.7% Funded 47.4% 46.5% 0.5% 72.7% 60.7% 60.8% 76.7% Unfunded 5.0% 18.8% 1.4% 2.2% 0.3% 1.4% 2.4% - 15 Collateral Shortfall Probability of Collateral Shortfall (average) 1 0 0 Expected Collateral Shortfall (average) 16 More information at: http://acpr.banque-france.fr/chaire-acpr.html