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Humanitarian Intervention Theo Farrell, CSI Lecture 2, 2011 Humanitarian intervention Definition: ‘forcible military intervention in humanitarian crises’  in failed states to secure aid  against murderous states to stop atrocities The new interventionism  1988-1993: 20 new missions  UN peacekeeping budget * $230 m in 1988 * $800 m – $1.6 b in 1990s Rare during Cold War 1. Superpower stand-off 2. Insufficient public pressure 3. UNSC log-jam Traditional peacekeeping • Chapter VI and a half’ activity - Required ceasefire and consent • Limited in number, size and scope - 1948-1978: 13 missions - 1978-1988: none - supervise truces The blue helmets UN Charter  Article 2(3): Settle disputes by ‘peaceful means’  Article 2(4): refrain from ‘threat or use of force’  Article 2(7): non-intervention  Article 51: inherent ‘right of self-defence.’  Chapter VII: peace enforcement – in response to a ‘threat to international peace and security.’ Humanitarian? Not in name  India in East Pakistan (1971)  Tanzania in Uganda (1978)  Vietnam in Cambodia (1978)  France in Central African Republic (1979) Cold war attitude “The notion that because a regime is detestable foreign intervention is justified and forcible overthrow is legitimate is extremely dangerous. That could ultimately jeopardise the very maintenance of international law and order.” French rep to UNSC, on Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, 1978 Many interventions  UN: Somalia (1992-95), Bosnia (1992-95), Cambodia (1992-93), East Timor (1999)  Coalition: northern Iraq (1991)  ECOWAS: Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997)  CIS: Tajikistan (1993), Georgia (1992)  NATO: Kosovo (1999) Serb thugs in action UN impotence Failure at Srebrenica Somalia: mission over (1993) Lessons from intervention failures SOMALIA (1992-1994)  dangers of crossing the consent divide BOSNIA (1992-1995)  dangers from peace spoilers  need to induce consent Shadow of Somalia  Agenda for Peace (1992) v. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (1995)  PDD-25 The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (1994) Rwandan genocide  800,000 massacred in 100 days (April-July 1994)  Hutu extremists v. Tutsi and Hutu moderates Causes of civil war  Mary Kaldor – ‘new wars’: identity, non-state actors, and low-tech.  Paul Collier – greed v. grievance: economic motives  Stuart Kaufman – elite manipulation v. mass moments: myths about ‘ancient hatreds’ Road to genocide  Elite manipulation of tribal identity  Collapse in commodity prices  French military support to Hutu extremists  Tutsi RPF assault on Kigali in 1993 leads to inclusion of Tutsis in govt  The trigger: shooting down President’s plane (6 April 1994) Rwanda, 1994 UN disgrace UN Response  UNAMIR reduced from 2,500 to 270 (21 April)  UNSCR 918 expands force to 5,500 (17 May)  2,300 strong French force create “Humanitarian Protection Zone” (9 July) Could intervention have worked?  the French success?  pace of slaughter?  UNAMIR warned of genocide Politics of HI: public opinion 1. ‘CNN effect’: dependent on degree of policy certainty and political unity 2. ‘Bodybags effect’: misunderstood by policymakers Politics of HI: UNSC politics  log-rolling problem  veto problem  posturing problem  co-ordination problem Peace ops: principles and practicalities  Objective – often ambiguous and unattainable  Unity of effort – divergent troop contributors  Mass – dispersal of forces  Surprise – little speed and secrecy in peace operations Peace ops: public opinion and operational pathologies  Strategic compression of battlefield  Full-force protection  Over-reliance on air power  Focus on exit strategies Doctrine of International Community  Are we sure of our case?  Have we exhausted diplomatic options?  Does the military instrument offer prudent and achievable goals?  Are we prepared to be in this for the long term?  Is our national interest truly engage? Tony Blair, Chicago, 22 April 1999 The future of humanitarian intervention?  Evolving norm – state practice over time – each intervention ‘unique’?  International Criminal Court: agent for action  R2P, Kosovo and Iraq – rising powers push back  Western appetite post Iraq and Afghanistan?