Yablo`s paradox
... finite information that grounds the conclusion ∀xα(x). Still, it might be suggested, at least for an infinite being, God, say, who really can apply the ω-rule, there is a paradox here that does not involve circularity. Even this is false, however. I chose to demonstrate that Yablo’s paradox involves ...
... finite information that grounds the conclusion ∀xα(x). Still, it might be suggested, at least for an infinite being, God, say, who really can apply the ω-rule, there is a paradox here that does not involve circularity. Even this is false, however. I chose to demonstrate that Yablo’s paradox involves ...
Quantification - Rutgers Philosophy
... weaker existential analog of (∀x)(R(x)→B(x)) is the very weak proposition (∃x)(R(x)→B(x)), which states that there exists at least one object x such that if x is a raven, then x is black, meaning “Among the class of ravens, if any actually exist (which we don’t guarantee), at least one is black”. Th ...
... weaker existential analog of (∀x)(R(x)→B(x)) is the very weak proposition (∃x)(R(x)→B(x)), which states that there exists at least one object x such that if x is a raven, then x is black, meaning “Among the class of ravens, if any actually exist (which we don’t guarantee), at least one is black”. Th ...
Raven paradox
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The raven paradox, also known as Hempel's paradox or Hempel's ravens, is a paradox arising from the question of what constitutes evidence for a statement. Observing objects that are neither black nor ravens may formally increase the likelihood that all ravens are black – even though, intuitively, these observations are unrelated.This problem was proposed by the logician Carl Gustav Hempel in the 1940s to illustrate a contradiction between inductive logic and intuition.